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"The business of banking ought to be simple; if it is hard, it is wrong." 
Walter  Bagehot (1873) 
1. Introduction 
According  to a variety  of commonly  used  indicators,  U.S.  commercial 
banking  appears  to be in both decline  and distress.  Figure 1 shows  that 
the banking  industry's  share of the  total amount  of funds  advanced  in 
U.S.  credit markets peaked  in 1975 at 34%. It has dropped  consistently 
since then,  to 26% in 1991. Banks have lost ground  to both open  market 
sources  of credit and nonbank  intermediaries.  Open  market credit rose 
relative to all forms  of intermediated  credit during  the  1980s; primarily 
responsible  was  the  growth  of  the  commercial  paper  and  junk  bond 
markets.  Finance companies  led the growth  of nonbank  intermediation 
over this period. 
Another  widely  cited  indicator  of banking  health  is the  failure rate. 
Bank  failures  averaged  less  than  two  per  year  in  the  1970s.  Table  1 
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Total 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1980-1991 
New  England  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  2  0  3  9  12  28 
Middle  Atlantic  1  3  6  3  1  4  0  3  1  3  7  6  38 
South  Atlantic  2  2  2  0  3  2  3  4  4  7  6  8  43 
East South  Central  2  0  5  14  13  9  5  4  0  1  1  2  56 
West  South  Central  0  3  11  7  12  34  58  108  163  150  115  32  693 
East North  Central  1  3  5  7  8  4  3  7  5  0  1  3  47 
West  North  Central  4  2  5  10  37  46  43  33  28  9  6  4  227 
Mountain  2  0  3  5  12  19  26  16  19  11  14  6  133 
Pacific  0  2  3  10  11  10  11  11  13  9  4  2  86 
United  States  13  15  41  56  97  128  149  188  233  193  163  75  1,351 
Source:  FDIC. 
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shows  that the failure rate jumped  dramatically in the 1980s, averaging 
roughly  130 per year between  1982 and  1991. Accompanying  the surge 
in the failure rate has been a rising number of banks in financial distress. 
Although  the  situation  has  improved  recently,  in late 1992 the  Federal 
Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC) listed  909 U.S.  banks with  com- 
bined  assets  of $488 billion as "problem institutions."  At the same time, 
regulators have been phasing  in new  requirements  that mandate closure 
of banks  that fail to meet  a minimum  standard of financial health. 
It is true that after many years of dismal performance banks recorded 
substantial  profits  in  1992.  But  this  news  is  not  entirely  comforting. 
Many believe  that banks  have  benefited  from an unusually  steep  yield 
curve by borrowing  short and  lending  long.  While the  surge  in profits 
has helped  banks replenish  their capital, the increased exposure  to inter- 
est rate risk has  discomforted  many  observers.1 
The  types  of  facts  we  have  just  reviewed  are well  known  and  are 
being  widely  discussed.  They  have  instigated  a new  debate  over bank 
regulatory  policy.  The  original  regulatory  design,  of course,  was  a re- 
sponse  to the  collapse  of banking  during  the  Great Depression.  How- 
ever,  by  starkly  illustrating  the  efficiency  cost  of  providing  a  public 
safety  net,  the savings  and loan  (S&L) debacle  has heavily  conditioned 
the  current  discussion.  Another  consideration  is  that the  problems  in 
banking  emerged  following  a movement  toward  deregulation  of finan- 
cial markets that began in the mid-1970s and escalated in the early 1980s. 
Although  there  is substantial  debate  over what  direction  new  banking 
reforms should  pursue,  there is widespread  agreement  that the regula- 
tory system  did not keep pace with the changes  in banking that occurred 
over the last 10 or 15 years. 
In this  paper  we  examine  the  important  trends  in banking  and  at- 
tempt  to pinpoint  the  sources  of problems.  Our objective is to evaluate 
the key policy  options.  To provide  a clear context  for doing  so, we  first 
dig well beyond  the surface facts just described  to assess  the nature and 
health  of U.S.  commercial  banking. 
Section  2 begins  by  documenting  the  important  trends.  We discuss 
why  commercial  banking  has  become  less  stable  over  time.  We  also 
document  that  banking  has  changed  considerably,  primarily  through 
the growth of off-balance sheet  activities.  Thus, despite  having a shrink- 
ing  share  of  on-balance  sheet  assets,  commercial  banks  remain  vital 
1. To quote  Charles E. Schumer,  senior member  of the House  Banking Committee:  "Any 
idiot can make money  by taking in money  at 3 percent and lending  it at 7 percent.  But 
anyone  who  looks  at the last four quarters and thinks  the banking  industry  is back on 
track is making  a mistake"  (Labaton,  1992). U.S. Commercial  Banking  *  323 
to  the  general  process  of  information-intensive  lending  and  liquidity 
provision.  This  section  also  describes  the  origins  of  the  too-big-to-fail 
doctrine,  which  we  believe  to be  one  of  several  key  factors central to 
understanding  the  recent problems  in banking. 
Section  3  examines  the  general  performance  of banks  over  the  last 
decade.  It is well  understood  that banking  problems  have  had a strong 
regional dimension.  On the surface, this seems  to suggest  that historical 
restrictions  on interstate banking may have been the key to contributing 
regulatory distortion.  We present  a variety of evidence,  however,  which 
suggests  that  the  main  source  of  problems  was  increased  risk taking 
by  large banks-banks  that  were  relatively  unconstrained  by  existing 
interstate  restrictions.  In particular, we  show  in a panel  data study  of 
individual  bank behavior  that,  after the  influence  of regional  factors is 
removed  from  the  data,  large banks  performed  much  worse  than  the 
mean.  From this and other evidence,  we conclude  that the poor ex post 
performance  by  large  banks  was  a  product  of  two  factors: enhanced 
competition  for the  banking  sector  and  a regulatory  environment  that 
encourages  risk taking  by  large banks.2 In this  spirit,  we  use  our evi- 
dence  on  the  differential  performance  across  size  classes  of  banks  to 
compute  a rough  estimate  of  the  impact  of  large banks'  extra-normal 
loan loss  performance  on the industry  aggregate  and find that this im- 
pact was quite sizable.  We also present  evidence  that it was mainly large 
banks  that were  deficient  of capital during  the recent "capital crunch." 
Section  4 provides  an analysis  of policy  reform. We discuss  both  the 
recent  legislation  and  other  basic  proposals  that are on  the  table.  For 
reasons  we  describe  in the paper,  the most  vexing  difficulty any policy 
must  confront  is the  trade-off  between  safety  and  efficiency  posed  by 
the  "Continental  Illinois problem,"  i.e.,  the appropriate  choice  of poli- 
cies for large banks  in financial distress. 
2. Trends  in the Nature  of U.S. Banking 
In this  section,  we  trace the  evolution  of the important  recent changes 
in  banking.  As  a way  to  gauge  the  nature  of  these  changes,  we  first 
examine  the trends in the composition  of bank assets  and liabilities. We 
then examine  the growth  of off-balance sheet  activities,  which  has been 
a significant  way  in which  banks  have  evolved. 
2. Gorton  and  Rosen  (1992) also  emphasized  the  poor  performance  of large banks,  but 
focus on managerial entrenchment  problems.  As we discuss  later, managerial entrench- 
ment  problems  may  be  an  important  additional  factor,  although  we  present  no  new 
evidence  on  this issue. 324 *  BOYD  & GERTLER 
2.1 THE  COMPOSITION  OF BANK BALANCE  SHEETS 
2.1.1  Bank Assets  Figure 2 portrays  the  relative behavior  of the broad 
categories  of bank assets  over the postwar  period.  Most striking are the 
rise in the share allocated to loans and the decline in the shares allocated 
to  securities  and  to  cash  and  reserves.  The  drop  in  the  latter reflects 
mainly a sequence  of reductions  in reserve requirements.  An important 
reason for the secular decline  in the security share was the development 
of  money  markets,  such  as  the  federal  funds  and  large  certificate  of 
deposit  (CD) markets. The increased access to short-term money  permit- 
ted banks  to reduce  precautionary  holdings  of securities.  Also,  certain 
types  of bank loans became  increasingly  liquid over time because  of the 
advent  of securitization  and the development  of markets for loan sales. 
Recently,  the  share of securities  has been  rising-partly  because  of the 
recession,  partly because  of the problems  in banking and the associated 
regulatory  changes,  and  partly because  of banks  exploiting  the  steep- 
ness  of the yield  curve. 
Figure 3 disaggregates  bank loans.  The main categories  are commer- 
cial and  industrial  (C&I) loans,  mortgages,  and consumer  credit. Inter- 
estingly,  the  shares  of  each  category  in  bank  loan  portfolios  were 
relatively  stable from 1952 to about  1973. Since the mid-1970s,  though, 
the  share  of  C&I loans  has  declined,  and  the  decline  has  been  fairly 
precipitous  since  the  early 1980s.  One  factor underlying  this trend has 
been  the  growth  of  the  commercial  paper  market,  which  largely  in- 
volved  a movement  of high-quality  C&I lending  off bank balance sheets. 
Another  factor is  the  growth  of  nonbank  intermediation,  particularly 
finance  company  lending,  as Figure 1 illustrates. 
A less  well  known  factor underlying  the relative decline  in C&I loans 
is the recent  growth  of offshore  commercial  lending.  While the flow  of 
funds  measure  of  C&I lending  includes  commercial  lending  both  by 
domestic  banks  and  by branches  of foreign  banks within  the U.S.  bor- 
der,  it underestimates  loans  to U.S.  firms by banks  located  offshore.3 
The  market  for offshore  lending  grew  rapidly  during  the  1980s.  One 
likely  factor,  according  to  McCauley  and  Seth  (1992), was  that  differ- 
ences  in reserve  requirements  on large CDs made  intermediating  (high 
quality)  loans  cheaper  offshore.  Banks lending  onshore  were  required 
to hold  3% reserves  against  large CDs; offshore  banks faced no reserve 
requirements.  Figure  4  illustrates  the  growth  of  offshore  commercial 
loans.  Somewhat  surprisingly,  offshore loans grew from 7% of total C&I 
lending  in the United  States in 1983 to more than 20% by 1991. Further, 
3. The  relative  importance  of offshore  loans  has  come  as a surprise  to many  observers. 
See McCauley  and  Seth  (1992) for a detailed  analysis. U.S. Commercial  Banking  *  325 
because  the offshore  banks  are at some  disadvantage  in the evaluation 
and  monitoring  of  small-  and  medium-sized  companies,  the  type  of 
commercial  loan  business  they  absorbed  was  likely  lending  to  larger, 
better-rated  companies.4 
The rise in offshore  lending  is symptomatic  of the  general  increased 
importance  of foreign banks to commercial lending  in the United States. 
As  Figure  4  indicates,  foreign  lending  from  both  on-  and  offshore 
sources  rose  from 22% to 45% of C&I loans  in the  United  States  over 
the period  1983-1991.  One implication,  of course,  is increased  competi- 
tion for U.S.  banks.  Another  is that regulatory policy must be designed 
from an international  perspective. 
While high-quality  commercial lending  moved  off bank balance sheets 
to both  domestic  and  foreign  competition,  the  relative  importance  of 
mortgage  lending  grew.  This phenomenon  began  in the mid-1970s and 
accelerated through  the 1980s. Banks undoubtedly  picked up some busi- 
ness  from failing  S&Ls, especially  in the latter half of the  1980s. How- 
ever,  the  shift  to  mortgage  lending  occurred  well  prior  to  the  S&L 
debacle. 
Disaggregating  mortgage  lending  uncovers  another important  trend. 
As  Figure  5  shows,  commercial  mortgage  lending  has  accounted  for 
much  of the recent  growth  in overall bank mortgage  lending.5  In 1980, 
home  mortgages  accounted  for about  60% of bank  mortgage  lending, 
and  commercial  lending  accounted  for about  30%. By 1990, the  shares 
of the  two  types  were  about  equal,  each  roughly  45% of overall bank 
lending.6  This  phenomenon  is  of interest  since  a good  fraction of the 
problems  in banking  stem from losses  in commercial real estate lending, 
as  we  discuss  later.  In  this  context,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the 
marked  shift  of  banks  from  residential  to  commercial  mortgages  was 
not  symptomatic  of mortgage  lending  in general.  Figure 6 shows  that, 
for all financial intermediaries,  the shares of aggregate mortgage lending 
going  to  the  residential  and  commercial  sectors  have  been  relatively 
stable. 
4. Roughly speaking, it is possible to divide commercial  loans into two categories:  those 
made to smaller, less well known firms that require  evaluation and monitoring  and 
those made to highly rated firms that require  relatively  little information-processing. 
The former  are typically  priced off the prime  lending rate, while the latter  are typically 
priced off the cost of issuing large CDs, the banks' marginal  source of funds. 
5. Underlying the growth of commercial  real estate borrowing  were both tax incentives 
and relaxation  of regulatory  constraints  on banks in the early 1980s.  Subsequent  rever- 
sals of the tax incentives contributed  to the decline in real estate. See Litan  (1992)  and 
Hester (1992). 
6. Some qualification  is in order since government-sponsored  securitized  mortgages  are 
treated  as securities  rather  than mortgages  in intermediary  accounting  statements.  We 
thank Myron Kwast for pointing this out. 326 ?  BOYD  & GERTLER 
The movement  of banks  into commercial  real estate  reflects part of a 
broader trend in bank lending  since the 1970s. High-quality  assets  such 
as securitized  residential  mortgages  or commercial loans  to highly  rated 
firms move  off bank balance sheets.  In a fight to maintain market share, 
banks  exploit  their  comparative  advantage  in  information-intensive 
lending  by  moving  into  riskier,  less  liquid  assets.  Banks' comparative 
advantage  stems  partly from experience  in evaluating  and monitoring. 
It also  stems  partly from the  nature  of the  regulatory  system,  particu- 
larly the nature of the public safety net.  Later we return to these  issues. 
2.1.2  Bank Liabilities  The flow  of funds  accounts  divide  bank liabilities 
into four categories:  checkable  deposits,  small time and savings  depos- 
its,  money  market  liabilities,  and  long-term  debt.  Figure  7 shows  the 
long-term  trends.  There are two  important  patterns. 
Perhaps  the  most  obvious  trend is the  secular decline  in the relative 
importance  of checkable deposits,  in favor of interest-bearing  liabilities.7 
As late as 1960, nearly  60% of bank liabilities were  checkable  deposits, 
and  only  about 30% were  small time  and  savings  deposits.  The use  of 
money  market instruments  and long-term  debt was negligible.  By 1990, 
checkable deposits  were least important,  less than 20% of total liabilities. 
Small time and savings  deposits  had climbed to 40%, while  money  mar- 
ket instruments  and long-term  debt each had climbed  to around  20%. 
The  second  important  trend,  which  is  closely  related  to the  first, is 
the  increased  use  of  managed  liabilities  relative  to deposits.  Managed 
liabilities  are short-term  instruments  that pay market-determined  rates 
of  interest.  In  contrast  to  deposits,  which  are relatively  immobile  in 
the  short  run,  managed  liabilities  are highly  interest  elastic.  Managed 
liabilities  permit  banks  to rapidly  adjust  their stock  of loanable  funds. 
Money  market instruments  are the prime example.  There are two main 
types  of money  market liabilities (also known  as purchased  money):  large 
time  deposits  and  federal  funds  plus  security  repurchase  agreements. 
The former (large CDs) typically have maturities that vary from 90 days 
to a year, while  the latter consist  largely of overnight  and weekly  loans. 
The use  of both  types  of instruments  grew  sharply  in the early 1970s, 
as deregulation  permitted  the development  of the money  market. 
Recently,  banks  also  appear  to  be  treating  small  CDs  as  managed 
liabilities.  With  the  deregulation  of  rates,  small  CDs  have  become  in- 
creasingly  sensitive  to  market  forces.  About  two-thirds  of  small  time 
7. Checkable  deposits include demand deposits and retail transactions  deposits such as 
NOW accounts. While  NOW accounts  pay interest, these rates  appear  much less sensi- 
tive to market  forces than rates on other interest-bearing  bank liabilities. U.S.  Commercial  Banking . 327 
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and  savings  deposits  are  small  CDs.  Thus,  if  we  include  small  CDs 
along with  money  market instruments  in the measure,  managed  liabili- 
ties now  constitute  more  than half of short-term bank obligations. 
The increased  use of managed  liabilities, and of money  market instru- 
ments  in particular, has a number  of important implications.  One obvi- 
ous  implication  is downward  pressure  on  banks'  net  interest  margins 
(the difference  between  the return per dollar on the asset  portfolio and 
the interest  cost per dollar of liabilities).  Another  is a rise in the interest 
sensitivity  of bank liabilities.  Now,  in contrast to years past,  an adverse 
movement  in  short-term  rates  may  substantially  raise  banks'  interest 
expenses.  The  development  of  the  money  market  has  also  served  to 
reduce  the constraints  of restrictions  on interstate banking.  The money 
market permits  banks  to cross  state borders  to obtain short-term funds 
(or,  in  the  case  of  the  money  center  banks,  to  cross  international 
borders). 
It is also  true that the  development  of the  money  market has  posed 
a vexing  problem for regulators.  In some  ways,  the failure of the regula- 
tory  system  to  appropriately  adapt  to  the  changes  introduced  by  the 
money  market planted  the seeds  for the problems  the banking industry 
faces  today.  With  the  efficiency  gains  of  the  money  market came  the 
cost of increased  exposure  to liquidity risk. While textbook descriptions 
of  bank  runs  still  conjure  up  images  of  people  rushing  through  the 
doors of depository  institutions  with passbooks  in hand,  the most likely 
source  of a widespread  banking  collapse  today  would  be a panic with- 
drawal  of  money  market  instruments.  Because  these  instruments  are 
typically  in  excess  of $100,000,  they  are not  covered  by deposit  insur- 
ance.  For this reason,  and because  they are highly  mobile funds,  abrupt 
withdrawal  is a possibility.  The key point is that, in the current environ- 
ment,  the  stability  of the banking  system-indeed,  the  stability of the 
overall  financial  system-is  tied  critically to  the  judgments  of lenders 
in the money  market. 
Indeed,  the  most  recent  experience  with  a system-threatening  run, 
the collapse  of Continental  Illinois in 1984, essentially  involved  a panic 
withdrawal  by large CD holders.  Rumors of insolvency  precipitated  the 
run on  the  money  center bank,  which  had  been  funding  roughly  90% 
of assets  with  purchased  money  (Hetzel,  1991). As  Greider (1987) de- 
scribed,  the  concern  of  both  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the  FDIC was 
that, if left unchecked,  the Continental  crisis could induce  a systemwide 
collapse.  Many  of the  Continental's  creditors  were  other banks.  More 
generally,  the  regulators  feared  that  losses  by  Continental's  creditors 
might  induce  runs  on  a  number  of  other  large  banks  that  had  been 
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banking  authorities  to  intervene  in  Continental  and  protect  the  unin- 
sured  creditors. 
It was  also  an  outcome  of  the  Continental  crisis  that  the  banking 
authorities  in the  United  States  formally certified the policy  of too-big- 
to-fail. The policy was implicitly in practice at least since the early 1970s, 
with  the  bailout  of Franklin National  (Boyd and  Runkle,  1993; Hetzel, 
1991; Isaac,  1993).  However,  in  September  1984,  in  the  wake  of  the 
Continental  intervention,  the Comptroller of the Currency testified  that 
11 bank holding  companies  were too-big-to-fail.  Further, in practice, the 
policy  appears  to have  been  extended  in varying  degrees  to banks out- 
side  the  top  11.  It is  important  to  recognize  that  the  doctrine  refers 
loosely  to  a menu  of  policies  that  vary  from  lenient  treatment  at the 
discount  window  or in the valuation  of assets to direct infusion  of capital 
and protection  of uninsured  creditors. 
Plugging  one  hole  in  the  dike,  however,  opened  up  another.  The 
too-big-to-fail  policy,  of course,  indiscriminately  subsidized  risk taking 
by large banks. At the same time, it created a nontechnological  incentive 
for banks  to become  large.8 Despite  being  a well-intentioned  effort to 
protect  against  liquidity  panics  in the  money  market,  the  policy  none- 
theless  helped  create  the  climate  for the  current  crisis.9 We  return  to 
this issue  repeatedly,  because  it is fundamental  to the policy  debate. 
Finally,  Figure  8 illustrates  the  secular behavior  of the  ratio of bank 
equity  capital  to  assets.  By  definition,  bank  equity  capital  equals  the 
difference  between  assets  and  liabilities.  It specifically  equals  the  sum 
of common  and preferred  stock outstanding  and undistributed  profits. 
Capital is important  because  it provides  a buffer to absorb loan losses. 
Bank  capital/asset  ratios  must  satisfy  minimum  regulatory  standards 
(currently in the  process  of change).  From the  early 1960s to the  early 
1980s,  the  aggregate  capital/asset  ratio dropped  by roughly  a quarter, 
from around  8% to below  6%. The  growth  in banking  assets  afforded 
by  the  development  of  the  money  market  (especially  over  the  period 
1962-1974)  was  not matched  by growth  in bank equity. 
Since the early 1980s, the aggregate  capital/asset  ratio has climbed on 
8. O'Hara and Shaw (1990) presented  evidence  that news  of the Continental  bailout policy 
raised  the  stock  prices  of large banks,  but not  the  stock  prices  of small banks  (which 
O'Hara and Shaw  dubbed  too-small-to-save  [p.  1588]). 
9. We are not suggesting  that the too-big-to-fail  policy completely  eliminated  market disci- 
pline  over  large banks.  Indeed,  Continental  management  was  fired.  One  should  not 
focus  on this policy  in isolation  of other events.  As we  discuss  later, we believe  it was 
the combined  climate of too-big-to-fail,  competitive  pressures  on banking,  and possibly 
problems  of managerial  entrenchment  (e.g.,  Boyd and Graham,  1991; Gorton and Ro- 
sen,  1992) that contributed  to the  substantial  rise in risk taking by large banks. 330 *  BOYD  & GERTLER 
average.  It is  important  to  recognize,  however,  that  this  growth  was 
largely  a  response  to  increased  regulatory  pressure  in  the  wake  of 
mounting  bank  and  S&L failures  and,  relatedly,  to  new  capital  stan- 
dards  that  were  phased  in  over  the  last  five  years  (which  we  discuss 
later). Much of the growth in this ratio also reflected a contraction in the 
denominator:  assets.  Because of the kinds of informational asymmetries 
stressed  by  Myers  and  Majluf (1984), issuing  new  equity  is  expensive 
for banks.  Banks  typically  use  retained  earnings  to build  equity  (Baer 
and McElravey, 1993). As a number of studies  have indicated  (Bernanke 
and  Lown,  1991; Peek  and  Rosengren,  1992), meeting  capital require- 
ments  in recent years has forced many  banks  to contract asset  growth. 
2.1.3  The Relation Between Asset Size and Balance Sheet Composition  The 
aggregate  balance  sheets  mask  some  important  differences  across  size 
classes  of banks.  Generally  speaking,  smaller banks adopt more conser- 
vative  asset  and  liability  positions  than  do  large banks.  An  important 
policy issue  is whether  these  differences  are due to technological  factors 
or to a regulatory  environment  that favors large banks. 
Following  the  convention  of  the  Federal Reserve Bulletin, we  divide 
banks by assets  into four size classes:  small (those  with assets  less than 
$300  million),  medium  ($300  million-$5  billion),  large  (greater  than 
$5 billion),  and large and money  center (the 10 largest). Figure 9 shows 
the  portfolio  composition  of  interest-bearing  assets  for each  of  these 
size  classes.  The data are based  on averages  over the five-year  period, 
1987-1991.  The  percentage  of  loans  in  the  asset  portfolio  varies  posi- 
tively with  size,  ranging from 59% for small banks to 72% for the money 
center  banks.  Conversely,  the  percentage  of  security  holdings  varies 
negatively:  from 31% for small banks  to 10% for the money  centers. 
Figure  10 disaggregates  loans  by bank  size.  The share  of loans  allo- 
cated  to business  lending-the  sum  of C&I and commercial real estate 
lending-varies  positively  with  size.  Both the consumer  and residential 
real estate  shares  vary  negatively.  Because  business  lending  generally 
accounts  for the substantial  majority of loan losses,  the general picture, 
then,  is that larger institutions  hold riskier asset positions.  Later we will 
present  some  information  on  loan  performance  that is consistent  with 
this contention. 
Figure  11 characterizes  the  composition  of  liabilities.  The  key  point 
here  is  that  the  relative  use  of  core  deposits  (transaction  and  savings 
and  time  deposits)  shrinks  with  size,  while  the  relative  use  of money 
market instruments  increases.  Nearly  90% of  small bank liabilities  are 
core  deposits.  Conversely,  money  market  instruments  constitute 
roughly  42% of  large  bank  liabilities  and  54% of  money  center  bank U.S. Commercial  Banking 331 
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liabilities.  Further,  the  money  center  banks  obtain  more  than  half  of 
their  purchased  funds  from  abroad.  (Deposits  in  foreign  offices  are 
mainly  money  market instruments.)  An  implication  of the  differences 
in liability structures  is that larger banks have  thinner net interest  mar- 
gins.  As Figure  13 illustrates,  the  net interest  margin varies from 3.9% 
for small banks  to 2.8% for the money  centers. 
In addition  to holding  riskier asset  portfolios  and  employing  greater 
use of money  market instruments,  larger banks have lower capital/asset 
ratios,  as  Figure  12 shows.  Indeed,  large  banks  were  responsible  for 
much  of the secular thinning  of the capital/asset  ratio portrayed in Fig- 
ure 8. Again,  a key policy question  is, Why? Does  this reflect some kind 
of  technological  advantage,  e.g.,  a better  ability  to  diversify  risks  or 
scale economies  in loan  processing?10 Or does  it instead  reflect mainly 
the  effect  of regulatory  bias induced  at least  in part by a too-big-to-fail 
policy? We  return to this issue  later with  an assessment  of the perfor- 
mance  of banks  across  size  classes. 
2.2 THE  GROWTH  OF OFF-BALANCE  SHEET  ACTIVITIES 
In recent  times,  commercial  banks have  changed  considerably  the way 
they  do business.  To a large extent,  these  changes  have  involved  mov- 
ing  traditional  activities  off  the  balance  sheet.  A  simple  but  common 
example  is  the  issuance  of  a standby letter of credit. With  this  arrange- 
ment,  a bank  guarantees  a loan  made  by  some  third party,  instead  of 
actually  funding  the loan itself.  The loan does  not appear on  the asset 
side  of the bank's  balance  sheet;  however,  its contingent  liability is es- 
sentially  the  same  as if it did. 
Figure  14 provides  some  indication  of the  rise in the relative impor- 
tance  of  off-balance  sheet  activities.  Fee  income  (income  from  off- 
balance  sheet  activities)  as  a percentage  of  total bank  assets  doubled 
between  1979 and  1991, from 0.75% to more than  1.5%.1  At the same 
time,  fee income  as a percentage  of total income  before operating  costs 
(the  sum  of fee  income  and  net  interest  income)  rose  from about 20% 
to about 33%. Further, the relative importance  of off-balance sheet activ- 
ities  varies  positively  with  bank  size.  Figure  13 indicates  that  for the 
money  center  banks,  fee  income  is  about  40% of  total income  before 
operating  costs. 
For several  reasons,  it is  important  to  account  for off-balance  sheet 
activities.  First,  the  unadjusted  balance  sheet  numbers  overstate  the 
10. McAllister  and  McManus  (1992)  presented  evidence  of  gains  to  diversification  for 
smaller banks. 
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decline  in  bank  activity.  A  good  fraction  of  the  relative  drop  in bank 
assets  simply  reflects  an  unbundling  of  the  traditional  functions  in- 
volved  in  intermediating  loans,  not  banks  vanishing  from  the  scene. 
As  we  discuss,  banks  remain  important  for  originating  information- 
intensive  lending,  although  the  fraction  of  loans  they  keep  on  their 
balance  sheets  after  origination  has  been  diminishing.  Perhaps  more 
significant  from a policy  standpoint,  banks remain extremely  important 
in  providing  short-term  loans  to  meet  working  capital  needs,  i.e.,  in 
providing  liquidity  for businesses.  Commercial  banks  remain involved 
in  virtually  all  short-term  working  capital  lending,  either  directly  or 
indirectly  through  off-balance  sheet  activity,  as we  discuss.  A banking 
crisis could  have  serious  ramifications  for the  flow  of short-term  busi- 
ness  liquidity  (Corrigan,  1983, 1991). 
A  second  and  closely  related  reason  for examining  the  off-balance 
sheet  numbers  is that most  off-balance  sheet  activities  entail  some  de- 
gree  of  risk.  Opinion  is  divided  on  the  degree  of  risk exposure,  and 
making a firm judgment  requires maneuvering  through uncharted  terri- 
tory.  Nonetheless,  regulators  have  recently  extended  capital  require- 
ments  to  banks'  off-balance  sheet  assets.  Any  policy  discussion  now 
requires  an  understanding  and  assessment  of  off-balance  sheet  activ- 
ities. 
There are three basic types of off-balance sheet activities: loan commit- 
ments  and  standby  letters  of credit,  loan  sales  and  securitization,  and 
provision  of derivative  instruments  (e.g.,  swaps).  We describe  each in 
turn and  offer a rough  assessment  of its relative importance. 
2.2.1  Loan Commitments  and Standby Letters of Credit  Most  commercial 
bank  lending  now  is done  on  a commitment  basis.  Firms anticipating 
needs  for funds  will  arrange for a loan commitment,  which  is essentially 
a  line  of  credit.  In  addition  to  using  commitments  to  fund  planned 
investments,  firms also use credit lines as a form of precautionary liquid- 
ity (Avery and Berger, 1991a). In times when  there is a general scramble 
for liquidity,  such  as the  onset  of recessions  when  firms must  finance 
unsold  inventories  and  hoarded  labor, banks  can expect  firms to draw 
down  their credit lines.  A commitment  is thus a liquid claim on a bank, 
similar in spirit to a deposit  claim. It follows  that commitments  impose 
a certain degree  of liquidity  risk on banks,  as do deposits. 
As discussed  earlier, a standby letter of credit is a guarantee  made by a 
bank for a loan extended  by a third party.  In this way,  it is an indirect 
vehicle  through  which  a bank  provides  a borrower  with  liquidity.  To 
indicate  the general importance  of standby  letters of credit and commit- 
ments,  Figure  15 plots  the  recent behavior  of the  stock  of each  instru- 334  ?  BOYD & GERTLER 
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ment  outstanding  relative  to C&I lending.  The ratio of standby  letters 
of credit to C&I lending  was  about 20% over the period  1983-1991.  The 
ratio of commitments  to C&I lending  rose  from 74% in 1983 to 90% in 
1991. 
Part of the relative  growth  in commitments  over this period was  due 
to the  rapid development  of the  commercial  paper  market.  As  an out- 
growth  of the Penn Central crisis in 1974, virtually all commercial paper 
issuers  must secure their loans with backup lines of credit from banks.12 
Viewed  in  this  light,  commercial  paper  issued  by  a nonfinancial  com- 
pany  may  be  thought  of  as  a  C&I loan  that  is  taken  off  the  bank's 
balance  sheet.  The bank provides  its services  to the  commercial  paper 
borrower by issuing  a backup line of credit and earns a fee for so doing. 
Because the borrower is sufficiently  creditworthy  (and, indeed,  has been 
certified  by  the  bank  issuing  the  credit  line),  nonbanks  are willing  to 
hold  the  paper.  But the bank remains  in the  picture,  because  the  firm 
issuing  commercial  paper  may  have  to draw  on its credit line in order 
to meet  the obligation  on its paper. 
The ratio of nonfinancial  commercial paper to C&I loans has increased 
rapidly in recent years,  going  from less  than 5% in 1969 to over 15% in 
1991.  The  firms  moving  into  the  paper  market  were  typically  large, 
highly  rated  companies.  Thus,  instead  of  directly  providing  loans  to 
these  firms, banks switched  to indirectly supporting  loans to these com- 
panies  by offering backup lines  of credit. In this way,  the growth  of the 
nonfinancial  commercial  paper  issues  represents  the  movement  of  a 
component  of lending,  a high-quality  component  in particular, off the 
banks' balance  sheet. 
Through  a similar mechanism,  banks are also involved  in supporting 
lending  by  finance  companies.  A recent  study  by  D'Arista  and  Schle- 
singer  (1992) has documented  that 90% of the commercial paper issued 
by  the  15 largest  finance  companies  is backed  by  a bank line  of credit 
or some other form of bank guarantee  (such as a standby letter of credit). 
An important corollary implication  is that banks remain vitally impor- 
tant to the  provision  of short-term  working  capital finance.  C&I loans, 
nonfinancial  commercial  paper,  and finance company  loans account for 
virtually all the short-term business  finance  in the United  States.  Thus, 
either  directly  or indirectly,  commercial  banks  remain vital to the  flow 
of business  liquidity. 
2.2.2  Loan Sales and Securitization  Another  important  recent  develop- 
ment  is the  sale of loans  that banks  initiate.  For example,  a firm might 
12. Brimmer  (1989) provides  an  excellent  discussion  of  the  Penn  Central crisis and  the 
ramifications  for the commercial  paper market.  See also Calomiris (1989). 336  .  BOYD  & GERTLER 
come  to a bank for a long-term  loan  to finance  capital equipment.  The 
bank provides  the necessary  evaluation  and designs  the terms and cove- 
nants.  After earning a fee,  it sells the loan, often in the form of a private 
placement,  to another  intermediary,  possibly  an insurance  company.  If 
the  bank  retains  no  explicit  liability  (i.e.,  if the  loan  is sold  without re- 
course), the loan is removed  from the bank's balance sheet. 
Although  loan  sales  have  grown  over  time,  it is important  to recog- 
nize  that a good  fraction of bank loans  are not sufficiently  liquid  to be 
sold  on  secondary  markets.  Figure  15 also  presents  some  information 
on  the  recent  behavior  of  commercial  loan  sales  relative  to  total  C&I 
lending.  The ratio of commercial  loan  sales  to C&I loans  grew  rapidly 
in the latter half of the 1980s, from about 10% in 1986 to more than 30% 
in  1989. This  phenomenon  parallels  the  surge  in junk bond  financing 
over this period.  Notably,  commercial loan sales,  along with junk bond 
financing,  seem  to  have  shrunk  in  relative  importance  over  the  last 
several  years.  In 1991, the  ratio of loan  sales  to C&I lending  was  back 
down  to  10%. Thus,  while  banks  do  sell  some  commercial  loans,  it 
would  be  incorrect  to  infer  that  most  of  their  commercial  assets  are 
sufficiently  liquid  to be sold  and valued  on secondary  markets. 
A phenomenon  closely  related to loan sales is securitization.  Securiti- 
zation involves  pooling  a large number  of loans  with  fairly uniform fea- 
tures  and  repackaging  them  as  asset-backed  instruments  that may  be 
sold  on  secondary  markets.  Candidate  types  of loans  for securitization 
have  fairly homogeneous  features,  are reasonably  well  collateralized, 
and  do  not  require intensive  monitoring.  Examples  include  residential 
mortgages,  automobile  loans,  and  credit card balances.  Unfortunately, 
there  are no  good  aggregate  data that  trace the  extent  of  this  activity 
back to the originating banks. Although  innovation  in this area is contin- 
uing,  securitization  is  still  not  a common  practice  for highly  idiosyn- 
cratic, information-intensive  commercial  loans. 
2.2.3  Derivative Instruments  Provision  of derivative  instruments  is the 
most  rapidly  growing  off-balance  sheet  activity-and  the  least  under- 
stood.  Derivative securities involve  trading of risks on existing  securities. 
A  common  example  is  an  interest  rate swap in  which  two  parties  ex- 
change  sequences  of interest  payments.  For example,  in a "plain vanilla 
swap,"  a fixed-rate commitment  is exchanged  for a floating-rate commit- 
ment.  Swaps  often  involve  different currencies,  e.g.,  exchanging  a U.S. 
dollar-denominated  sequence  of interest payments  for one denominated 
in deutsche  marks. Indeed,  the use  of interest  rate swaps  is believed  to 
have  originated  in the Eurobond  market in 1981. In addition  to interest 
rate and currency swaps,  banks now  trade a number of derivative  secu- 
rities based  on  swaps,  e.g.,  "swaptions,"  "caps,"  and  "collars." U.S. Commercial  Banking  - 337 
Derivatives  are often  intermediated  through  brokers,  and large com- 
mercial banks  are some  of the  largest  brokers in this  market.  Brokers, 
including  commercial  banks,  do not always  fully net  (i.e.,  hedge)  their 
positions.  Acting  as a swap  broker thus  often  entails  risk taking. 
Some  regulators,  most  notably  E.  Gerald  Corrigan  (1991),  have  ex- 
pressed  grave  concerns  about  the  risk exposure  of  commercial  banks 
operating  in the swaps  and derivatives  markets. The markets are largely 
unregulated,  and  new  securities  continue  to  be  developed  at a rapid 
pace.  To provide  some  idea  of the  size  of the market,  Greenbaum  and 
Thakor  (1992) estimate  that  in  the  fourth  quarter of  1989, commercial 
banks  held  gross  swap  positions  of over  $500 billion.  The  gross  swap 
position,  however,  is simply  a measure  of the principal amount  on the 
security  underlying  the  traded  interest  payment  streams.  Therefore,  it 
does  not  meaningfully  measure  a bank's  net  risk exposure.  Unfortu- 
nately,  even  among  market participants,  there is a general lack of agree- 
ment  over how  to quantify risk exposure,  especially  for the more exotic 
instruments.  As a consequence,  there are few,  if any,  aggregate  indica- 
tors that are useful  to guide  thinking  about this issue. 
Regulators  seem  mainly  concerned  that  derivatives  activity  in  the 
United  States is concentrated  among  seven  large commercial banks. The 
fear is that losse^  onL  derivatives  trading  could  force the  failure of one 
of  these  large  institutions,  which  would  send  shock  waves  not  only 
through  the derivatives  markets, but also through  money  and exchange 
rate markets to which  derivatives  trading is closely  linked through com- 
plex  arbitrage strategies  (Phillips,  1992). In the  absence  of any  reliable 
data,  it is difficult  to assess  these  arguments.  Nonetheless,  this clearly 
seems  to be an issue  deserving  of more attention. 
2.2.4  Credit Equivalents of Off-Balance  Sheet Activities  The new  Bank of 
International  Standards  (BIS) capital standards  explicitly  recognize  the 
importance  of off-balance sheet activities for risk exposure.  They require 
that off-balance sheet commitments  be transformed into credit  equivalents 
for the  purpose  of setting  capital requirements  against  these  activities. 
The  procedures  for  doing  this  are  quite  complicated  and  have  been 
developed  by the Federal Reserve  System  and other central banks over 
a period  of several  years.  What we  do here is to simply  take the credit 
equivalent  total  for  each  bank  and  compute  the  aggregate.  Doing  so 
provides  some  feel  for  the  aggregate  importance  of  off-balance  sheet 
activities  and  for the risk exposure  they  entail. 
The Federal Reserve's  Board of Governors  provided  us with  the off- 
balance  sheet  data. The computer  program that does  the actual compu- 
tation  of  credit  equivalents  is  in  Berger and  Udell  (forthcoming).  The 
earliest year for which  data are available is 1983. Although  a large num- 338 *  BOYD  & GERTLER 
ber  of  off-balance  sheet  activities  are included  in  these  computations 
(e.g.,  foreign exchange,  future,  option,  and swap  positions),  about 90% 
of the  total credit equivalents  result  from two  off-balance  sheet  items: 
standby  letters  of credit and loan  commitments.13 Figure 16 shows  the 
ratio  of  off-balance  sheet  credit  equivalents  to  C&I loans,  computed 
quarterly over  the  period  1983-1991  with  the  Berger and  Udell  proce- 
dure.  Figure 16 also  shows  that off-balance  sheet  activities,  in terms of 
the  credit  equivalents,  now  represent  a  substantial  fraction  of  bank 
assets,  roughly  equal to half of C&I lending. 
To summarize,  increased  competition  and  financial innovation  have 
induced  (1) a movement  of liquid  high-quality  assets  off bank balance 
sheets  in favor of less  liquid assets  such as commercial real estate loans 
and (2) an increased  engagement  in off-balance sheet activities.  Further, 
there  is a strong  correlation  between  size  and  portfolio  structure with 
large banks  appearing  to adopt  a riskier portfolio  stance. 
3. Recent Performance 
In this  section,  we  pinpoint  the  sources  underlying  the  bleak  perfor- 
mance  of banks in recent years.  We begin by presenting  a set of aggre- 
gate  measures  of  bank  performance.  We  then  turn  to  an  analysis  of 
disaggregated  data. The goal here is to sort out the relative importance 
of regional  factors versus  risk taking by large banks as determinants  of 
the industry's  poor overall performance. 
3.1 AGGREGATE  PERFORMANCE  MEASURES 
Figure  17 presents  the  trend  in two  commonly  used  measures  of bank 
profitability: the rate of return on equity and the rate of return on assets. 
Both measures  exhibit similar behavior  over the period  1973-1991  Both 
decline  fairly steadily  after 1979. The exception  (for both measures)  is a 
sharp drop in 1987 followed  by a recovery in 1988. However,  the plunge 
in  1987  reflects  large  write-offs  of  international  loans,  the  timing  of 
which  was  somewhat  arbitrary. The main point of Figure 17 is that after 
trending  down  since  1979,  bank  profitability  in  the  latter half  of  the 
1980s was  significantly  below  its average for most of the 1970s. The rate 
of return  on  equity  dropped  from about  14% in  1979 to an average  of 
about 8% over 1989-1991.  Similarly, the rate of return on assets dropped 
13. Some have argued  that the capital that banks are required to set against swaps  (under 
the new  Bank for International  Standards  agreement)  does  not adequately  reflect the 
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from  about  0.75% to  0.5%.  Indeed,  bank  profitability  was  lower  over 
the last several  years  than during  the severe  1981-1982  recession. 
Figure  18 shows  that  a rise  in  the  rate of  loan  losses  accompanied 
the  general  decline  in profitability.  Provisions  for loan losses  increased 
during  the  1981-1982  recession,  as  would  normally  be  the  case  in  a 
downturn.  However,  the  upward  trend  in these  provisions  continued 
through  the  1980s. The loan loss  rate rose from about 0.2% of assets  in 
the  late  1970s to  nearly  1% of assets  over  the  last  several  years.  Con- 
versely,  the  net  interest  margin  actually  rose  slightly  over  this  period, 
from about 3.3% in 1977 to 3.8% in the mid-1980s to an average of about 
3.6% over  the last several  years.  The aggregate  measures  thus  suggest 
that  the  decline  in bank  profitability  stemmed  from loan  losses  rather 
than from a shrinking  net  interest  margin.  Why didn't  the net interest 
margin drop over this period,  despite  increased  competition  and dereg- 
ulation  of interest  rates on  bank liabilities? In our view,  the  slight  up- 
ward  trend  of the  net interest  margin is symptomatic  of the  decline  in 
bank  asset  quality  over  the  period.  That is,  the  rise  in  the  aggregate 
loan  spread  likely reflects  the  decline  in the  asset  quality mix over  the 
period.  The sharp rise in loan losses  over the period also fits the general 
story.  In the  next  several  subsections,  we  bring more evidence  to bear 
on this issue. 
3.2 SIZE  AND REGIONAL  EFFECTS  IN BANK  PERFORMANCE: 
DESCRIPTIVE  EVIDENCE 
It is first useful  to provide  some  background  on the cross-sectional  dis- 
tribution of banks by size and region.  We divide banks into six asset-size 
categories  based  roughly  on  the  classifications  used  by the  FDIC. The 
asset-size  categories  range  from  less  than  $50  million  to  more  than 
$10 billion.  Figure 19 presents  information  on  the percentage  of banks 
and  the  percentage  of bank assets  across the  six size  classes,  based  on 
averages  constructed  over the period  1983-1991.  Clearly, though  there 
are  many  banks  in  the  United  States,  bank  assets  are  concentrated 
among  a relatively  tiny percentage.  Banks with more than $10 billion in 
assets  constitute  only  0.3% of  the  total  number;  however,  they  held 
37.4% of aggregate  bank assets  on  average  over the nine-year  sample. 
Banks with  more  than  $1 billion  in assets  numbered  2.5% of the total, 
but held about two-thirds  of overall assets.  At the other extreme,  nearly 
80% of the banks  had less  than $100 million  in assets,  but these  banks 
in  total  only  held  about  13% of the  total.  Figure 20 similarly  portrays 
the  distribution  of banks  across  census  regions.  In NBER terms,  large 
banks  tend  to be located  near salt water  (East and West  Coasts),  while 
small banks  tend  to concentrate  around  fresh water. 340 - BOYD & GERTLER 
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Table 1 presents  evidence  on bank failures  disaggregated  by census 
region.  Over  the  period  1980-1991,  1,351 banks  failed.  The  peak  was 
the five-year interval 1986-1990,  when  70% of the failures occurred. Not 
surprisingly,  there is a strong regional  pattern that is closely  associated 
with  the temporal  pattern of certain regional  economic  difficulties.  The 
(West  South  Central)  oil  states,  principally  Texas,  accounted  for  the 
majority of failures: nearly 700. These failures are bunched  during 1986- 
1990,  roughly  the  period  when  oil  and  real estate  prices  collapsed  in 
this region.  A distant second  in importance  are the (West North Central) 
agricultural states.  Agricultural problems  in this region during the mid- 
1980s precipitated  nearly 200 bank failures. 
For two  related  reasons,  however,  the  raw  failure numbers  portray 
an  incomplete  picture.  First,  these  numbers  do  not  take into  account 
the size of failed banks.  While small bank failures are far more plentiful, 
a large bank  failure places  far greater pressure  on  the  FDIC insurance 
fund.  Despite  the  rash  of  failures  in  the  agricultural  states,  e.g.,  the 
assets  of  closed  banks  never  exceeded  1% of  the  total  in  the  region, 
because  virtually all of the banks involved  were small. Similarly, despite 
there  being  only  12 bank  failures  in  New  England  in  1991,  assets  of 
failed  banks  amounted  to 8.8% of the  regional  total.  Table 2 confirms 
the general  point.  It shows  that in the peak period of 1986-1990,  banks 
with  assets  more than  $500 million  accounted  for less  than 4% of total 
bank failures, but nearly 60% of the total assets  of failed banks. Further, 
the  three  banks  with  assets  more  than  $5 billion  that failed  accounted 
for more  than  30% of the  total failed-bank  assets.  A second  reason  the 
failure  data  are  misleading  is  that  they  do  not  take  into  account  the 
historical regulatory  bias in favor of large banks.  Because the FDIC has 
been  less  willing  to close  large banks,  the failure numbers  do not accu- 
rately capture  overall bank performance. 
The  biases  inherent  in  using  failure  data  as  indicators  of bank  per- 
formance  lead  us to consider  several  finer measures.  Figures 21 and 22 
report, by census  region,  the ratios of loan loss provisions  to assets  and 
net  income  to  assets,  respectively.  The  numbers  are  averages  across 
individual  banks  within  the  respective  region  over  the  period  1983- 
1991. By both  indicators,  the  banks  in the  West  North  Central region 
(which  includes  Texas)  performed  worst.  Both  figures  suggest,  how- 
ever, that regional considerations  alone do not provide a complete  story. 
In the troubled New  England region,  e.g.,  banks on average performed 
at the  national  mean  in terms  of loan loss  provisions  and  only  slightly 
below  the  national  mean  in  terms  of  net  income.  Similarly,  the  poor 
performance  of the  money  center banks  located  in the Middle  Atlantic 
region  was  at variance with  other banks there,  which  performed  above 
the national  mean  on average. Table 2  BANK FAILURES BY SIZE CLASS: 1986-1990 
Number of  Percent of  Assets of failed  Percent of total 
Asset size class  failed banks  total failures  banks ($ mil.)  failed-bank assets 
Less  than $500 million  912  96.6  $44.4  40.4 
$500 million-$1  billion  19  2.0  12.1  11.0 
$1 billion-$5  billion  10  1.1  18.8  17.1 
More than $5 billion  3  0.3  34.6  31.4 
Source:  FDIC. U.S. Commercial  Banking  - 343 
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Splitting  the  data by  size  yields  a clearer picture.  Figure 23 reports 
the  ratio of loan  loss  provisions  to assets  across  the  six size  classes  of 
banks,  and  Figure 24 reports  the  ratio of net  income  to assets.  Across 
size  classes,  there  is a U-shaped  pattern to loan loss  provisions.  Banks 
in the largest category  (more than $10 billion in assets)  performed worst 
by  this  measure.  The  ratio of  provisions  to  assets  declines  with  size, 
reaching  a minimum  at the  class  of  banks  between  $100 million  and 
$250 million  in  assets.  The  ratio then  begins  to  rise  monotonically  as 
size  declines  further. 
Net  income  to assets  is of course  a better overall indicator of perfor- 
mance  than  is provisions  to assets.  However,  the  U-shaped  pattern of 
the latter is simply  mirrored by a hump-shaped  pattern of the  former, 
as Figure 24 illustrates.  Gauged  by  net  income  to assets,  banks  larger 
than $10 billion still perform least well,  and banks between  $100 million 
and $250 million  still perform best. 
Judging  from Figures 23 and 24, we  see  that relative loan loss perfor- 
mance influences  the pattern of net income  to assets  across size classes. 
Losses  on loans  to less-developed  countries  (LDC loans) were  likely an 
important  factor because  these  losses  were heavily  concentrated  among 
large banks.  Perhaps  less  well  known  is that large banks  also  suffered 
disproportionately  from commercial  real estate lending.  We know  from 
the previous  section  that the fraction of commercial real estate  loans  in 
bank portfolios  varied  positively  with  size.  However,  even  within  the 
category  of commercial  real estate  lending,  large banks  performed  less 
well.  Table 3 shows  that in the third quarter of 1992, the percentage  of 
noncurrent,  or "problem,"  real estate  loans  ranged  from  1.6% for the 
smallest  banks  to  7% for  the  largest  banks.  In every  case,  business- 
related  real  estate  lending-"construction"  and  "commercial"-ac- 
counted  for most  of  the  noncurrent  loans,  but  the  share  within  each 
category  rises  steeply  with  bank  size.  Astonishingly,  21% of construc- 
tion loans  at the largest banks  are noncurrent. 
From a policy  perspective,  it is important  to determine  how  well  the 
negative  correlation  between  size  and  performance  survives,  once  we 
control  for region.  For example,  there  is a regional  dimension  as well 
as a size  dimension  to commercial  real estate  problems.  Table 4 shows 
that noncurrent  real estate  loans  are heavily  concentrated  in the North- 
East  and  the  West,  the  two  main  areas  where  real  estate  problems 
linger.  Thus,  it is possible  that the correlation between  size and perfor- 
mance  of the  real estate  loans  is simply  due  to the  fact that the banks 
in the troubled North-East  and West are larger on average.  If this is the 
case,  then  restrictions  on interstate  banking  might be primarily respon- 
sible for the  disproportionate  concentration  of loan  losses.  If the nega- Table 3  PROBLEM REAL ESTATE LOANS  BY BANK SIZEa (THIRD QUARTER 1992) 
Size of bank (%) 
Category of loans  Less than $100 mil.  $100 mil.-$1  bil.  $1 bil.-$10  bil.  Over $10 bil. 
All real estate  loans  1.64  2.18  4.05  7.07 
Construction  2.76  5.62  12.65  21.96 
Commercial  2.10  3.01  5.33  10.84 
1-4  Family  1.21  1.23  1.50  1.76 
Source:  FDIC. 
aEach  entry  is the percentage  of loans  noncurrent.  A noncurrent loan is one  that is past due  90 days  or more or that is in a nonaccrual  status. Table 4  PROBLEM REAL ESTATE LOANS  BY REGION" (THIRD QUARTER 1992) 
Region 
Category  of loans  North-East  South-East  Central  Mid-West  South-West  West 
All real estate  7.2%  2.5%  1.9%  1.5%  2.5%  5.1% 
Construction  23.8  6.3  6.0  2.4  4.0  16.9 
Commercial  10.0  3.8  2.8  3.1  3.9  5.9 
1-4  Family  2.4  1.1  0.9  0.6  1.3  1.5 
Home  equity  1.7  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.7  0.7 
Source:  FDIC. 
aEach entry is the percentage  of loans  noncurrent.  A noncurrent loan is one  that is past  due  90 days  or more or that is in a nonaccrual  status. U.S.  Commercial  Banking  347 
tive correlation between  size and performance  remains after controlling 
for location,  then  it is possible  that distortions  induced  by a too-big-to- 
fail safety-net  policy  may have  been  important. 
3.3 SIZE AND  REGIONAL EFFECTS  IN BANK PERFORMANCE: 
FORMAL EVIDENCE 
We  now  investigate  the  relation  between  performance  and  size,  after 
controlling  for  the  influence  of region.  The  data  set  we  employ  contains 
annual  observations  on  individual  banks  over  the  period  1983-1991.14 
The  sample  is  obtained  from  the  FDIC's  call  report  and  contains  the 
universe  of  domestic  insured  commercial  banks  over  this  period. 
We  consider  two  performance  measures:  the  ratios  of net  loan  charge- 
offs  to  assets  and  net  income  to  assets.15  Each,  of  course,  is  a measure 
of  ex  post  performance.  Our  working  hypothesis,  particularly  for inter- 
preting  the  behavior  of  charge-offs,  is  that  over  the  sample  period  a 
poor  ex  post  performance  is  the  consequence  of  a  high  degree  of  ex 
ante  risk  taking.16  The  idea  is  that  during  the  1980s  there  was  a  series 
of  large  negative  shocks  (as  Figs.  17  and  18  suggest)  to  the  banking 
system  and  that  by  examining  ex  post  returns  we  are  getting  some  feel 
for  the  outer  tails  of  the  respective  distributions. 
For  each  bank,  we  average  each  of  the  two  performance  indicators 
over  the  sample  period.  We  work  with  the  time-averaged  values  of 
these  indicators  for  several  reasons.  First,  the  timing  of  charge-offs  and 
14. Thus, the organizational  entities we study here are banks. It is true that many banks 
are owned by bank holding companies, which control one or more banks and often 
nonbank affiliates  as well. For many purposes, the most appropriate  organizational 
entity is the consolidated  holding company. However, the objective  here is specifically 
to study bank performance.  Consolidated  statements  for holding company  banks are 
not easily available. Finally, although they do not control for regional effects, Boyd 
and Runkle (1993)  obtain evidence of an inverse relation  between performance  and 
holding company size, similar  to the inverse relation  between size and performance 
that we find at the bank level. 
15. Net loan charge-offs  include all loans determined  to be uncollectible  net recoveries  on 
(previously written-off) loans. This entry is not an accounting  expense but rather  a 
reduction in a reserve account. Provision for loan losses is the accounting expense 
entry that reduces profits  and was discussed in Section  3. When the data are averaged 
over several years as we do here, the two loan loss measures are highly correlated. 
Thus, for the present purposes, it makes little difference which is employed. We 
consider charge-offs because we  eventually want to make quantitative  statements 
about actual losses. 
16. Ideally, we would like to measure ex ante portfolio  risk. However, this is extremely 
difficult  to do for banks for several  reasons. First,  the sample period  is relatively  short. 
Second, the data are based on accounting  rather  than market  value measures. There 
is considerable  evidence that the accounting data are intentionally  smoothed (e.g., 
see Boyd and Runkle, 1993). This has the effect of causing accounting measures to 
systematically  understate  risk. 348 - BOYD  & GERTLER 
income  is to some  degree  arbitrary in the short run. Because clean mar- 
ket  value  assessments  of  the  overall  portfolio  are unavailable,  banks 
have  some  short-run discretion  over when  they report gains and losses. 
Over time,  the discrepancy  between  accounting  and market value indi- 
cators  declines.  Second,  working  with  time-averaged  data  permits  a 
more  parsimonious  representation  of  a model.  In  general,  bank  per- 
formance  should  vary  over  time  with  economic  conditions.  However, 
because  we  are mainly  interested  in uncovering  secular relationships, 
it seems  reasonable  to average out the time effects: the benefit is a much 
simpler  model  to evaluate. 
At least two  types  of bias are possible.  First, some  banks drop out of 
the  sample  over  time.  Because  exit  is  most  often  due  to  failure,  exit 
and performance  are likely correlated.  Omitting  exiting banks from the 
sample  could  therefore  bias  the  estimates.  We adjust  for this  problem 
by  averaging  each  of  the  performance  indicators  for  a bank  over  its 
lifetime  in  the  sample,  even  if  the  bank  exists  partway  through  the 
sample  period.  In  this  simple  way,  we  include  information  from  the 
exiting  banks  in our estimates. 
The  second  possible  bias  is  that bank  performance  could  feed  back 
and affect size.  If a bank does  not  perform well,  e.g.,  it may decide  to 
contract  its  assets.  We  address  this  issue  by  using  presample  data  to 
sort banks.  Thus,  we  use  the  1983 data  (see  Appendix)  to  sort banks 
into size  groups  as well  as into regions.  The performance  indicators we 
use  as dependent  variables are then  time-averaged  over 1984-1991.  For 
robustness,  we  also  split  the  sample  and  work  with  time  averages  of 
the  performance  variables  over  1987-1991.  In this  latter case,  we  use 
1986 data to sort the banks. 
The initial set of independent  variables are dummies  for census  region 
and  for  size.  We  use  the  six  size  classes  defined  earlier (in  Fig.  19). 
For several reasons,  we  use discrete indicators rather than a continuous 
variable for size.  First, the earlier descriptive  analysis  suggests  that the 
relationship  between  performance  and size is likely to be highly  nonlin- 
ear.  Second,  by  using  size  class  indicators  that  correspond  closely  to 
the categories  the FDIC uses  to report all types  of bank data, we directly 
link  our  results  with  a variety  of  other  types  of  information  on  bank 
performance.  A  similar  consideration  motivates  the  use  of  census  re- 
gions  to denote  location: The FDIC uses  this indicator to present  infor- 
mation  on performance  across locations. 
Let D] denote  a dummy  for region j,  D' a size  dummy  for size  class 
k,  and  Xijk the  time-averaged  value  of  a bank  performance  indicator. 
Then  the basic model  we  estimate  is given  by 
xijk =  ajDj +  bkD  +  Eijk,  (1) U.S. Commercial  Banking  .  349 
where  eijk  is a random  error term and where,  to identify  the model,  one 
of the  coefficients  on  the  six size  class dummies  is normalized  at zero. 
We  model  bank  performance  as  a linear  function  of  a region-specific 
intercept,  aj, and  a slope  coefficient,  bk, that depends  on the  size  class 
of the  bank.  Under  the  initial formalization  given  by Equation  (1), we 
restrict the  slope  coefficient  on size  class to be identical  across regions. 
We also consider  a more general formulation  that permits the size class 
slope  coefficients  to vary across regions,  as given  by 
Xijk =  ajDr +  bjkD  D  +  ,ijk  (2) 
Here the  slope  coefficient  on size,  bjk,  is region  specific. 
Under  the  null  hypothesis  that  size  is unimportant  to performance, 
the  slope  coefficients  on  size  equal  zero  for each  size  class.  If the  null 
is  true,  then  restrictions  on  interstate  banking  may  be  paramount  in 
explaining  bank performance.  Roughly  speaking,  if the region dummies 
capture  all the  explanatory  power,  then  it is likely  that constraints  on 
the banks'  ability to diversify  nationally  have  inhibited  banking.  But, if 
the too-big-to-fail  policy has been  a significant  distortion  (in the context 
of  significant  competitive  pressures  on  banking  and  managerial  en- 
trenchment  problems  for large banks),  then  we  should  expect  to reject 
the null.  Further, after controlling  for regional effects,  we should  expect 
an inverse  connection  between  performance  and  size,  especially  at the 
upper  tail of the  size  distribution. 
Table 5 reports the results from estimating  the basic model,  described 
by Equation (1). There are four regressions,  corresponding  to two differ- 
ent  dependent  variables  (the ratios of net charge-offs  to assets  and net 
income  to  assets)  and  two  different  sample  periods  (1984-1991  and 
1987-1991).17 We normalize  at zero  the coefficient  on the banks in size 
class  3  ($100 million-$250  million  in  assets).  In  each  case,  we  easily 
reject the null that size class is unimportant.  Further, to a first approxi- 
mation,  both the U-shaped  pattern of loan losses  and the hump-shaped 
pattern of net income  across size classes  that appeared earlier in Figures 
23 and 24 remain  after we  control for the influence  of region. 
For net  charge-offs,  the  coefficients  on  the  size  dummies  increase 
monotonically,  moving  from size  class  3 up  to  size  class  6 (more than 
$10 billion in assets).18 Further, this ordering of coefficients is statistically 
17. Although  we  do not report the statistics here,  the general results we  obtain are robust 
to using  the first half of the sample  period,  1984-1986,  and also to running  the regres- 
sions  year by year. 
18. The results  are the  same  if we  use  net  charge-offs  divided  by loans,  rather than  net 
charge-offs  divided  by assets  as the dependent  variable. We chose  the latter because 
we  were  interested  in analyzing  the ex post  performance  of the entire bank portfolio. Table 5  MODEL OF BANK  PERFORMANCE AND  SIZE, CONTROLLING FOR REGIONAL EFFECTSa 
Size classb 
Equation  (1)'s dependent 
variables  and time periodsc  1  2  3  4  5  6  Adj. R2  F 
Net  charge-offs/Assets 
1984-1991  0.00029  -0.00042  0  0.00069  0.00149  0.00467  0.11  232.59 
(1.64)  (-2.04)  (2.16)  (4.56)  (4.33)  (0.00) 
1987-1991  -0.00014  -0.00045  0  0.00150  0.00254  0.00600  0.12  135.59 
(-0.61)  (-1.81)  (3.37)  (6.94)  (4.81)  (0.00) 
Net  income/Assets 
1984-1991  -0.00108  0.00077  0  -0.00126  -0.00237  -0.00599  0.10  144.66 
( -  3.72)  (2.43)  (-2.24)  ( -  4.47)  (-3.80)  (0.00) 
1987-1991  -0.00236  -0.0005  0  -0.00185  -0.0035  -0.00556  0.12  129.24 
(-6.11)  (-1.21)  (-2.34)  (-5.57)  (-4.30)  (0.00) 
aTable 5 reports estimates  of a model  that includes  9 region  and  6 size  class  dummies,  with  size  class  3 coefficient-normalized  at zero.  The t statistics  are 
in parentheses  and are corrected  for heteroskedasticity  using  a White correction.  The F statistic and the significance  level  reported  in the last column  refer 
to the test that all regional  dummies  are equal. 
bAsset-size  classes:  1: $0-$50  mil.  2: $50 mil.-$100  mil.  3: $100 mil.-$250  mil.  4: $250 mil.-$1  bil. 5: $1 bil.-$10  bil. 6: over  $10 bil. 
CDependent variables  are time-averaged  over  the  respective  sample  periods.  Independent  variables  are based  on  the year  prior to  the  respective  sample 
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Table 6  COEFFICIENT  TESTS  ON THE  SIZE  EFFECTSa 
Size classes  compared 
Dependent  variables 
and time  periods  6=5  6=4  5=4  2=1 
Net charge-offs/Assets 
1984-1991  8.37  13.19  4.22  22.44 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.00) 
1987-1991  7.49  12.03  4.22  2.94 
(0.01)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.09) 
Net income/Assets 
1984-1991  5.00  8.36  2.66  68.21 
(0.03)  (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.00) 
1987-1991  2.32  6.39  3.31  38.23 
(0.13)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.00) 
aTable  6 reports F statistics  and significance  levels for tests of equality of size coefficients  between 
different  size classes. 
significant,  as Table 6 indicates.  An analogous  set of results arises when 
the dependent  variable is instead  net income  to assets.19 
It is also  interesting  to observe  that the  smallest  size  banks  (class  1, 
those  with  less  than $50 million  in assets)  performed  less well  than the 
next two  larger classes.  The difference,  however,  is sharper on average 
with net income  to assets  than with net charge-offs to assets.  One inter- 
pretation  is that the  smallest  size banks do not exploit  scale economies 
that seem  available at least up  to the  size 3 category. 
We  next  turn to  the  more  flexible  model  described  by  Equation  (2), 
which  permits  the slope  coefficient  on size to vary across regions.  Table 
7 reports  the  coefficients  on  each  size  class  averaged  across  regions, 
with  the averages  weighted  by the percentage  of banks in the size class 
of interest that are in the respective  region.  Table 7 also reports the joint 
significance  of  a  size  class  dummy  across  regions  for each  size  class. 
The  results  from  the  general  model  correspond  to  those  from the  re- 
stricted one.  Once  again,  both  the U-shaped  pattern for net charge-offs 
and  the  hump-shaped  pattern  for  net  income  emerge,  and  both  are 
highly  significant.  Analogously  to Table 6, Table 8 presents  tests  of the 
19. Because  equity  is measured  in book values,  we  did not consider  the rate of return on 
equity  as an alternative  dependent  variable.  Because  this  measure  does  not  include 
capital gains and losses  on equity,  it could  be seriously  distorted.  For example,  a bank 
with  near zero equity  due  to poor performance  could  have a high  ratio of net income 
to equity.  It is true that there is a size bias in net income  to assets,  because  large banks 
use systematically  more financial leverage.  However,  a reasonable calculation suggests 
that this bias is small relative  to the differences  we  observe  in the data. Table 7  MODEL WITH REGION-SPECIFIC SIZE EFFECTSa 
Averages of interaction  coefficients  by size classb 
Equation  (2)'s dependent 
variables  and time periodsc  1  2  3  4  5  6  Adj. R2  % gain in SSR 
Net  charge-offs/Assets 
1984-1991  0.00015  -  0.00033  0  0.00048  0.00125  0.00347  0.12  2.87 
(5.53)  (1.77)  (1.79)  (6.34)  (28.35) 
1987-1991  -0.00038  -0.00047  0  0.00158  0.00233  0.00630  0.12  2.57 
(1.38)  (1.56)  (2.48)  (9.28)  (18.70) 
Net  income/Assets 
1984-1991  -0.00087  0.00082  0  -0.00111  -0.00192  -0.00432  0.12  5.57 
(10.79)  (2.21)  (1.59)  (6.72)  (16.49) 
1987-1991  -0.00200  -0.00001  0  -0.00154  -0.00315  -0.00389  0.12  4.78 
(8.75)  (1.36)  (1.43)  (8.20)  (11.15) 
aTable  7 reports  estimates of a model that includes 9 regional and 54 interaction  terms between size classes and regions, with the coefficients  on the 
interaction  terms for size class 3 banks normalized  at zero. Reported  are weighted averages of the size coefficients, where the weights depend on the 
fraction  of banks in the size class within the region. The F statistics  for tests that the coefficient  terms  for a size class are jointly zero across regions are in 
parentheses  and are corrected  for heteroskedasticity  using a White correction.  The last column reports  the percentage  gain in SSR  from using the model 
with region-specific  size effects instead of the model where size effects are constant across regions. 
bAsset-size  classes: 1: $0-$50 mil. 2: $50 mil.-$100 mil. 3: $100 mil.-$250 mil. 4: $250 mil.-$1 bil. 5: $1 bil.-$10 bil. 6: over $10 bil. 
CDependent  variables  are time-averaged  over the respective  sample periods. Independent variables  are based on the year prior to the respective  sample 
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equality  of coefficients  on  adjacent  size  classes  within  a region,  jointly 
across  all regions.  The  message  of Table 6 is preserved:  Between  size 
classes  3 and  6, the  inverse  ordering  between  size  and performance  is 
significant,  and the smallest  size class of banks performs poorly relative 
to the two  next larger ones. 
We know  from the  previous  section  that asset  structure,  as defined 
by broad  categories  of loans,  varies  systematically  with  size.  Does  the 
relation  between  size  and  performance  operate  through  these  differ- 
ences  in  broad  categories  of  lending?  That  is,  have  large  banks  per- 
formed less well mainly because  they have invested  more heavily in C&I 
and commercial  real estate lending?  We address  this issue  by adding  to 
the basic model  [Equation (1)] two loan share variables: the ratio of C&I 
loans  to total loans  and the ratio of commercial real estate loans to total 
loans.  In each  case,  we  use  the  presample  value  of the  share variable 
to minimize  the problem  of simultaneity. 
Tables 9 and 10 show  that the explanatory power  of the size dummies 
remains after including  the asset share variables. This is true for both net 
charge-offs  and net income  and over both the 1984-1991  and 1987-1991 
sample  periods.  The share variables are generally  significant,  with signs 
as  expected.  However,  they  do  not  displace  the  size  effect.  The  size 
dummies  exhibit  the  same  pattern  and  generally  the  same  levels  of 
significance  as in the basic case.  These  results  suggest  that even  within 
broad categories  of loans,  large banks tended  to take greater risk. They 
are compatible  with the informal evidence  in Table 4 which  showed  that 
even  within  similar  categories  of  commercial  real estate  lending,  the 
Table 8  JOINT  COEFFICIENT  TESTS  OF REGION-SPECIFIC  SIZE  EFFECTS' 
Size classes compared 
Dependent variables 
and time periods  6=5  6=4  5=4  2=1 
Net charge-offs/Assets 
1984-1991  4.63  44.48  6.04  4.39 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
1987-1991  6.56  11.32  4.67  2.08 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
Net income/Assets 
1984-1991  2.89  15.55  3.77  10.53 
(0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
1987-1991  5.86  3.69  3.13  11.57 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
"Table 8 reports F statistics and significance  levels  for tests of the hypothesis  that the interaction terms 
for two  size  classes  are jointly equal across regions. Table 9  MODEL WITH SIZE EFFECTS, CONTROLLING FOR BOTH LOAN  COMPOSITION  AND  REGION' 
Size classb  Commercial 
Dependent variables  real estate/  C&I/  Ad. 
and time periodsb  1  2  3  4  5  6  total loans  total loans  R 
Net  charge-offs/Assets 
1984-1991  0.00079  -0.00016  0  0.00051  0.00108  0.0035  --0.00091  0.00598  0.13 
(4.04)  (-0.81)  (1.63)  (3.29)  (3.25)  (-1.24)  (9.97) 
1987-1991  0.00045  0.0000  0  0.00127  0.00236  0.00465  0.00585  0.0063  0.14 
(2.04)  (-0.02)  (2.97)  (7.00)  (5.89)  (5.74)  (9.62) 
Net  income/Assets 
1984-1991  -0.00251  -0.00011  0  -0.00088  -0.00163  -0.00381  -0.00511  -0.01372  0.12 
(-8.09)  (0.36)  (-1.60)  (-3.21)  (-2.64)  (-4.29)  (-13.28) 
1987-1991  -0.00264  -0.00083  0  -0.00117  -0.00315  -0.00491  -0.01583  -0.0139  0.14 
(-  7.47)  (-2.24)  (-1.53)  (-5.31)  (-4.43)  (-8.77)  (-12.47) 
aTable 9 reports  estimates  of  model  that includes  9 regional,  6 size  class  dummies,  and  two  portfolio  variables:  commercial  real estate  loans  (mortgage 
loans  over  total loans)  and  C&I loans  over  total loans  (C&I). The  size  class  3 coefficient  is normalized  at zero.  The t statistics  are in parentheses  and  are 
corrected  for heteroskedasticity  using  a White  correction. 
bAsset-size  classes:  1: $0-$50  mil.  2: $50 mil.-$100  mil.  3: $100 mil.-$250  mil. 4: $250 mil.-$1  bil.  5: 1 bil.-$10  bil. 6: over $10 bil. 
CDependent  variables  are time-averaged  over  the  respective  sample  periods.  Independent  variablel  are based  on  the year  prior to the  respective  sample 
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Table 10  COEFFICIENT  TESTS  ON THE  MODEL  WITH  LOAN 
COMPOSITION  VARIABLESa 
Size  classes  compared 
Dependent  variables 
and time  periods  6=5  6=4  5=4  2=1 
Net  charge-offs/Assets 
1984-1991  4.91  7.45  2.09  38.62 
(0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.00) 
1987-1991  7.95  15.61  5.24  7.39 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
Net income/Assets 
1984-1991  2.21  3.82  1.31  126.17 
(0.14)  (0.05)  (0.25)  (0.00) 
1987-1991  2.29  8.09  4.83  38.43 
(0.13)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.00) 
aTable  10 reports  F statistics  and significance  levels for tests of the equality  of size coefficients  between 
different  size classes. 
large banks fared far worse  than the average.  Also,  owing  to the concen- 
tration of LDC lending,  large bank C&I portfolios  were  riskier. 
A question  that remains  is whether  the abnormal risk taking by large 
banks could be explained  by factors completely  unrelated  to regulatory 
policy  (i.e.,  the  subsidy  inherent  in  the  too-big-to-fail  policy).  Could 
it be  the  case  that  for technological  reasons  large banks  have  simply 
specialized  in different  types  of loans  than  smaller banks  and  that the 
large banks have just been  unlucky? We are skeptical of this hypothesis 
providing  a complete  explanation,  for a variety  of reasons.  The largest 
category  of banks  (those  with  assets  more  than $10 billion)  performed 
significantly  worse  than the next largest (from $1 billion to $10 billion). 
It is hard to believe  that important  differences  in scale economies  exist 
between  these  two kinds  of banks that permit the former to make loans 
the  latter cannot.  In addition,  the  banks  in  the  next  size  class  down, 
from $250 million  to $1 billion,  are still reasonably  large and,  thus,  still 
relatively  unrestricted  in  the  types  of  loans  they  can  make.20 A  pure 
technological  story  also  has  difficulty  explaining  why  the  large banks 
20. In point  of  fact,  banks  in  this  size  category  participated  in  LDC loan  syndications. 
However,  they  did  not  typically  adopt  the  same  degree  of risk exposure  as did  the 
larger banks.  Indeed,  Dornbusch  (1986) observed  that some  money  center banks held 
LDC loans  equal  to twice  their capital. More generally,  scale economies  may explain 
why  only large banks can originate certain types of loans such as LDC loans.  However, 
because  loan sales  are possible,  scale economies  do not explain why  large banks hold 
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adopted  a riskier liability  structure  as well  as a riskier asset  structure. 
As we  documented  earlier (in Figs. 11 and 12), the large banks operated 
with  both  thin  equity  capital-to-assets  ratios and thin net interest  mar- 
gins,  in  the  latter instance  because  of  the  extensive  use  of  purchased 
money.  It is worth emphasizing  that large bank capital/asset  ratios were 
not  only  low  relative  to the  industry  mean  but were  also  substantially 
lower  than  those  held  by  competing  nonbank  intermediaries  such  as 
finance and life insurance  companies  (Boyd and Rolnick, 1989). A natu- 
ral explanation  is that this policy led to the mispricing of the (technically) 
uninsured  liabilities  of these  institutions.21 
We next  conduct  a simple  experiment  to determine  the  quantitative 
importance  of the  poor  relative  performance  by large banks.  We com- 
pute  the  reduction  in total loan  losses  that would  have  resulted  if the 
two  largest categories  of banks  (classes  5 and 6) had performed  as well 
as  the  third-largest  category  (class  4).  Specifically,  for each  year  and 
each region,  we  compute  values  of net charge-offs  for the class 5 and 6 
banks,  assuming  that  they  had  the  same  net  charge-off/asset  ratio as 
the class 4 banks in the respective  region.22 We then use this information 
to  compute  the  yearly  reduction  in  aggregate  charge-offs  that  would 
have  resulted.  If the extra-normal loan losses  of the class 5 and 6 banks 
reflect the consequences  of excessive  risk taking encouraged  by regula- 
tory policy,  then this computation  is a rough estimate  of the cost of this 
policy. 
Table 11 shows  that under these  assumptions  total charge-offs  would 
have  averaged  about  25% lower  over  1983-1991.  This amounts  to  an 
extra loss in wealth  over the period of $45 billion-if  not quite an Okun 
gap,  then  certainly a heap  of Harberger triangles.  To place the number 
in  context,  the  total  equity  capital  of  the  banking  system  (charge-offs 
ultimately  reduce  capital) is  $232 billion.  It is worth  emphasizing  that 
the  class  6 banks  (those  with  assets  over  $10 billion)  account  for the 
lion's share of the cost. Finally, we observe  that two-thirds  of the cost- 
about  $30  billion-arises  in  the  peak  period  of  banking  difficulties, 
1988-1991,  mainly because  of the poor performance of the class 6 banks. 
Our cost estimate  is conservative,  we think, for several reasons.  First, 
we  did  not  use  the  best  performing  banks,  class  3,  as the  benchmark 
21. It is also possible  that managerial entrenchment  problems may be an important reason 
why  large banks tried to maintain their asset base in the face of significant competitive 
pressures  (Boyd  and  Graham,  1991; Gorton  and Rosen,  1992). However,  we  believe 
that  the  implicit  subsidy  of  purchased  money  afforded  by  the  too-big-to-fail  policy 
was  important  in supporting  this  objective. 
22. We  are assuming  that class  four bank  portfolios  are available  in elastic  supply  (i.e., 
we  are assuming  that  the  type  of  portfolio  held  by  class  four banks  is  available  in 
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Table 11  REDUCTION  IN AGGREGATE  LOAN LOSSES  IF LARGE  BANKS 
(> $1 BIL.  ASSETS)  HAD EXPERIENCED  SAME  LOSS  RATE  AS 
MIDDLE-SIZED  BANKS  ($250  MIL.-$1 BIL.) 
Reduction  by size of bank 
$1 bil.-$10 bil.  Over  $10 bil.  Over  $1 bil. 
assets  assets  assets 
Time  period  %  $ bil.  %  $ bil.  %  $ bil. 
1983  5.3  0.53  7.5  0.75  12.9  1.29 
1984  2.6  0.28  19.6  2.12  22.3  2.41 
1985  -1.2  -0.16  13.6  1.79  12.4  1.64 
1986  -2.1  -0.34  14.6  2.39  12.5  2.04 
1987  6.1  0.94  13.0  2.01  19.1  2.96 
1988  10.4  1.85  20.9  3.71  31.4  5.57 
1989  6.8  1.47  31.3  6.75  38.0  8.20 
1990  8.6  2.34  32.4  8.83  41.0  11.17 
1991  7.2  2.21  25.6  7.83  32.7  10.01 
Total reduction 1983-1991  9.12  36.18  45.29 
Mean 1983-1991  4.9  1.01  19.8  4.02  24.7  5.03 
Mean  1987-1991  7.8  1.76  24.7  5.83  32.5  7.58 
for calculating  the cost.  Using  the size class 3 banks  ($100 million-$250 
million)  as  the  benchmark  for performance  instead  of the  size  class  4 
($250 million-$1  billion) would  produce  a larger estimate. 
Second,  to  the  extent  that  loan  losses  forced  capital  constraints  to 
bind  tighter,  the  shadow  value  of  charge-offs  may  exceed  the  dollar 
amount.  Table 12 presents  information  by  size  class  on  the  fraction of 
assets  held  by banks that were  capital-constrained  during the height  of 
the "capital crunch"-in  1990 and 1991. Table 12 shows  that the capital 
crunch was almost exclusively  a large bank problem.  It was mainly large 
banks  that  were  constrained,  and  large banks  accounted  for the  vast 
majority of assets  held  by constrained  banks.23 These  facts correspond 
to the  recent  empirical  evidence  on  the  impact of bank capital on loan 
growth  during  1990 and  1991.  Both  Peek  and  Rosengren  (1992) and 
Furlong  (1991) showed  that the  link between  capital declines  and loan 
growth  (first documented  by  Bernanke  and  Lown,  1991) was  stronger 
in magnitude  for large banks than for small banks.  Thus,  to the degree 
loan losses  forced a reduction in lending  (via the impact on bank equity), 
our cost estimate  should  be adjusted  upward. 
Our calculations  are only  intended  to  question  the  efficiency  of the 
23. Avery and Berger  (1991b)  make a similar  observation  for the year 1989. 358 ?  BOYD  & GERTLER 
safety  net  that existed  in  the  1980s and  not  whether  the  safety  net  is 
desirable.  As  discussed  in Section  2, despite  the changes  in this indus- 
try, a major banking  crisis could  still potentially  disrupt  the  economy. 
As Summers  (1991) observed,  a financial crisis that raised the unemploy- 
ment  rate by a percentage  point  for a year would  result in a $100 billion 
loss  in output.  We expand  on the general  issue  of the safety  net in the 
next  section. 
4. Policy 
We now  analyze  policy reforms in banking,  including  both reforms that 
have  been  recently  implemented  and  those  that  remain  under  active 
debate.  Our  assessment  is  that  the  regulatory  changes,  although  less 
than  ideal,  work  toward  mitigating  the  main  adverse  incentive  effects 
of the  old  regime.  Further, we  find  that the banking  industry's  recent 
complaints  about  overregulation  are difficult  to  substantiate  formally. 
We do think,  however,  that after a transition period that permits banks 
to improve  their equity capital base, further evolutionary  changes  would 
be beneficial.  It might  be desirable,  e.g.,  to reduce  some  of the regula- 
tory burden  on banks (particularly regulations  that micro-manage  lend- 
ing) in return for a moderate  scaling back of the federal safety  net. 
4.1 RECENT  REFORMS 
In the late 1980s, it became  apparent  that reform of the banking  indus- 
try's regulatory/insurance  structure was  badly needed.  The issue  could 
not be ignored,  given  both the S&L crisis and the mounting  loan losses 
of commercial banks,  documented  earlier in this study.  In addition,  the 
rising  share  of domestic  commercial  lending  by foreign  banks  (seen  in 
Fig.  4)  and  the  large  share  of  foreign  loans  in  U.S.  bank  portfolios 
Table 12  PERCENTAGE  OF ASSETS  OF CAPITAL-CONSTRAINED  BANKS 
BY SIZE  CLASSa 
Share  of each  bank  size 
$0-$250  $250  $1 bil.- 
mil.  mil.-$1 bil.  $10 bil.  over  $10 bil. 
c.a. for 
Year  c.a.  t.a.  c.a.  t.a.  c.a.  t.a.  c.a.  t.a.  all banks 
1990  2.86  3.90  4.05  9.81  24.17  20.73  68.92  45.66  26.16 
1991  5.65  2.78  6.14  5.16  28.01  8.59  60.20  14.15  9.32 
"For  each size class of banks, this table  reports  the percent  of assets held by capital-constrained  banks 
within that size class over the total assets of all capital-constrained  banks (c.a.) and the percent of 
assets of capital-constrained  banks within that size class over the total bank assets of that size class 
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made  regulators  realize that banking  had become  increasingly  an inter- 
national business.  The need  to coordinate  policy across borders became 
clear. 
At  the  time,  a variety  of  reform  proposals  were  debated,  including 
100% reserve  (narrow) banking,  prompt  closure  of troubled banks,  re- 
duced  deposit  insurance  (or  coinsurance),  market  value  accounting, 
risk-based  insurance  premia  (or capital requirements),  and reduced  re- 
strictions  on  interstate  banking.  Two  major policy  responses  emerged 
from the  debate:  the BIS capital standards  and the FDIC Improvement 
Act (FDICIA). We consider  each here. 
The  Basle  Accord  of  1988 introduced  the  BIS capital standards.  The 
objective  was  to  harmonize  regulations  on  banks  that  did  business 
across  international  borders.  The  standards  require that, by December 
1992, banks  involved  in international  finance  have  capital equal to 8% 
of a (crude) risk-weighted  measure  of assets.  Included  in the  measure 
of assets  are adjustments  for off-balance  sheet  activities.  There are also 
plans  to extend  the BIS standards  to interest  rate risk. 
The FDICIA was  entirely  an initiative by the regulatory authorities  in 
the United  States.  Generally speaking,  it imposes  tougher requirements 
on  U.S.  banks  than  those  enacted  under  the  Basle Accord.  Regulatory 
implementation  of FDICIA extended  the BIS standards to all U.S. banks, 
not just those  involved  in international  lending.  It also requires prompt 
closure of problem banks,  regulatory constraints tied to tier capital stan- 
dards  (beyond  those  in  the  BIS standards),  and  tougher  supervision 
and regulation.  It also requires the implementation  of risk-sensitive  in- 
surance  premia no later than January 1, 1994. 
Other provisions  of the FDICIA attempt to roll back the too-big-to-fail 
policy.  Saving  a large U.S.  bank  now  requires  the  formal concurrence 
of bank  regulators,  the  Secretary of the  Treasury,  and  even  the  Presi- 
dent.  These provisions  also restrict discount  window  lending,  a favorite 
tool  over  the  last  decade  for keeping  large banks  afloat.24 Finally and 
importantly,  the provisions  impose  restrictions on interbank lending  to 
banks that fail to meet adequate  capital levels.  The goal here is to reduce 
the likelihood  that closing  a large bank will precipitate a wave  of failures 
throughout  the  banking  system.  The idea  is to avoid  the  kind  of trap 
regulators  fell into during  the Continental  Illinois crisis. The policy will 
increase  regulators'  ability to commit  to a policy  of closing  large banks 
that perform poorly. 
It is difficult to evaluate  the new  policy package because  it is recently 
implemented.  Nonetheless,  the  reforms  appear  to  directly  confront 
24. See Schwartz (1992) for a discussion  of how  the nature of discount  borrowing  changed 
in  the  1980s from its  traditional  role as a mechanism  to help  banks  meet  temporary 
shortfalls  in reserves  to a channel  for helping  large banks in trouble. 360 *  BOYD  & GERTLER 
what our analysis  suggests  has been the main problem with the existing 
regulatory  system:  the  subsidy  to  risk  taking  by  large  banks.  As  we 
have  argued,  an  important  way  the  subsidy  has  played  out  is  large 
banks'  holding  less  capital  than  they  might  have  otherwise.  The new 
capital requirements  offset  this  distortion.  In this  way,  they  force  the 
large  banks  to better  internalize  the  costs  of  their  portfolio  decisions. 
The increased  cushion  of capital reduces  the probability that taxpayers 
will have  to finance  loan losses.  Finally,  the measures  taken under  the 
FDICIA to  scale  back  the  too-big-to-fail  doctrine  will  also  help  to  im- 
prove  market discipline  over large banks. 
Is the  8% capital requirement  excessive?  This is a tough  question  to 
answer.  One difficulty is that the capital standards necessarily  use book 
value  rather  than  market  value  measures.  Book  values  undoubtedly 
understate  the  value  of some  assets  but overstate  the  value  of others. 
However,  a preliminary  analysis  of holding  company  data suggests  no 
systematic  bias (see,  e.g.,  Kaufman,  1991). It is also relevant  that non- 
bank financial intermediaries  tend to be better capitalized.  For example, 
finance  companies,  which  in some  ways  may be viewed  as uninsured 
banks,  operate  with  capital/asset  ratios around  15% (Benveniste,  Boyd, 
and  Greenbaum,  1991).  Indeed,  the  8%  risk-weighted  requirement 
amounts  to a considerably  lower  raw capital ratio than the 8% average 
ratio that banks held  in the  1960s (see  Fig. 8). 
It is true that the banking  industry  has complained  about the regula- 
tory burden  that the new  reforms impose.  A recent study by the Federal 
Financial Institutions  Examination  Council  (1992) summarized  many  of 
the bankers'  complaints.  The estimated  compliance  costs,  however,  do 
not  stem  from a careful empirical analysis.  The report depends  largely 
on  the  results  of a survey  in which  the  bankers  themselves  estimated 
their compliance  costs.  While some of the estimates  include FDIC insur- 
ance premiums  and the opportunity  cost of reserves,  none  include  the 
subsidy  implicit  from the protection  afforded  by the public safety  net. 
Supervision  and regulation  has become  more intrusive.  Determining 
capital adequacy  unavoidably  involves  examiners  having  to make sub- 
jective  judgments  about  the  values  of bank loans.  Because  bank loans 
are  still  largely  information-intensive  and,  thus,  not  publicly  traded, 
objective  market value  assessments  are difficult,  if not impossible.25 
We  are  sympathetic  to  the  idea  that  the  bluntness  of  new  capital 
requirements  may  adversely  penalize  lending  to  small  and  medium- 
sized  businesses.  The  risk weights  on  the  capital standards  are based 
on  broad  classifications  of  loans.  Thus,  e.g.,  LDC loans  and  working 
25. For this  reason,  widespread  adoption  of market value  accounting  seems  impractical 
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capital loans  for small businesses  receive  the same weight.  Our empiri- 
cal analysis  suggests  that the  main  sources  of loan losses  are LDC and 
commercial  real estate  loans  by  large  banks,  not  working  capital  and 
equipment  loans to bank-dependent  firms, the traditional staple of com- 
mercial  bank  lending.  Some  of  the  detailed  but  blunt  restrictions  on 
lending  (e.g.,  crudely  standardized  loan valuation  requirements)  merit 
reconsideration,  especially  for well-capitalized  banks. Generally,  impos- 
ing capital standards  and measures  that increase market discipline  over 
large banks  is  a superior  strategy  to  regulatory  micro-management  of 
lending. 
4.2 LOOKING  AHEAD:  FUTURE  DIRECTIONS  FOR  POLICY 
We conclude  by addressing  two  major issues  which  the recent reforms 
have  not  addressed.  The  first is  whether  to  eliminate  restrictions  on 
interstate  banking;  the  second  (and  more  fundamental)  is whether  to 
scale back the  system  of deposit  insurance. 
4.2.1 Interstate  Banking  Restrictions on interstate banking likely contrib- 
uted  to the high  number  of failures,  particularly failures of small banks 
in the  oil and  agricultural regions.  But as we  have  argued  earlier, the 
main stress on the system  has not been the raw number of bank failures; 
rather, it has been  the poor performance  of large banks.  Restrictions on 
interstate  banking  do  not  prevent  large banks  from  diversifying  their 
loan portfolios  nationally.  Specifically,  these restrictions do not preclude 
banks  from  opening  up  loan  production  offices  across  state  borders. 
While  scale  economies  may  inhibit  smaller  banks  from  pursuing  this 
activity,  large  banks  do  not  face  formidable  obstacles  to  national  (or 
even international)  lending.  Accordingly,  we do not think that interstate 
branching  restrictions  have  been  the main culprit. 
At the  same  time,  we  do think that there is a strong  case for further 
reducing  restrictions  on  interstate  banking.  It is  true  that  branching 
facilitates  lending  to smaller borrowers.  In this vein,  branches  may be 
more efficient conduits  than loan production  offices for cross-state lend- 
ing.  Any  reform  that  improves  the  efficiency  of  large banks  is worth 
taking seriously. 
Our results  also  suggest  that the  inability to exploit  scale economies 
rather than  disproportionate  loan  losses  may be the  main problem  for 
the  smallest  category  of  banks  (those  with  less  than  $50  million  in 
assets).  Encouraging  these  banks  to  merge  with  larger banks  may  be 
desirable.  At the same  time,  we  are skeptical about the benefits  of per- 
mitting mergers among very large banks. The clear pattern of our results 
is  that  banks  in  the  middle  of  the  size  distribution  ($100  million- 
$1 billion) performed best in the 1980s. Several detailed  studies  of the is- 362 - BOYD  & GERTLER 
sue also concluded  that recent large bank mergers have not produced  ef- 
ficiency gains (see Berger and Humphrey,  1991, and references therein). 
4.2.2  Scaling Back  Deposit Insurance:  Narrow Banking  and Coinsurance  The 
toughest  question  in banking policy,  of course,  is where  exactly to draw 
the line for the public safety net. The kind of evidence  needed  to answer 
this question  confidently  is not available. Modern banking systems  have 
been  heavily  regulated  and  heavily  protected.  Analysis  of this kind  of 
data provides  little insight  into the consequences  of scaling back protec- 
tion.  Further, because  financial  systems  have  evolved  significantly,  in- 
sights  from historical periods  of free banking have limited value as well. 
As argued  earlier, any discussion  of banking  stability for modern  times 
should  center  around  the  performance  of the money  market, which  is 
a relatively  recent  phenomenon. 
Theory  provides  surprisingly  little  guidance.  Diamond  and  Dybvig 
(1983) provided  the most  elegant  argument  for deposit  insurance.  They 
formalized  the idea that banks are vulnerable to liquidity panics because 
they  offer  liquid  liabilities  but  hold  illiquid  assets,  the  latter a  direct 
consequence  of their involvement  in information-intensive  lending.  Dia- 
mond  and  Dybvig  (1983)  concluded  that  deposit  insurance  provides 
welfare  gains by eliminating  panic withdrawals  that disrupt the flow of 
bank lending. 
The  Diamond  and  Dybvig  paper  has  stimulated  a lengthy  academic 
debate over whether  private financial institutions  in a laissez-faire  envi- 
ronment  can make the types  of arrangements  necessary  to avoid liquid- 
ity panics.  A number  of papers have pointed  out that the Diamond  and 
Dybvig  results hinge  on exogenous  restrictions on the kinds of liabilities 
that banks offer savers.  A key restriction is that deposit  liabilities satisfy 
a "sequential  service  constraint,"  which  requires that banks honor cus- 
tomer withdrawals  at face value  until  they  no longer  have  funds.  This 
makes  depositors'  payoffs  depend  on their respective  place in line,  cre- 
ating the potential  for a panic run. Several authors,  e.g.,  Wallace (1988) 
and  Chari  (1989),  have  pointed  out  that  banks  could  in  theory  avert 
panics  by  offering  deposits  with  equitylike  features.  However,  these 
types  of  contracts  (which  condition  depositor  payoffs  on  the  pace  of 
withdrawals)  do  not  seem  to be  observed  in  practice.  In the  end,  we 
are left  with  the  impression  that  theory  is  still sufficiently  incomplete 
to provide  crisp answers. 
At  the  same  time,  there  are few  contemporary  economists  who  are 
willing  to advocate  a purely  laissez-faire  approach  to banking.  Perhaps 
coming  closest  to this position  are advocates  of narrow  banking.  The idea 
behind  this  policy  is  to  separate  the  money  and  lending  activities  of 
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be  backed  100% by  safe  assets  such  as government  securities.  In this 
way,  the  money  on  the  liability  side  of  the  banks'  balance  sheets  is 
completely  uncoupled  from the loans  on the asset  side.  Under  the pol- 
icy, banks  fund  loans  only  with  liabilities that are not publicly insured. 
The motive  for narrow banking  is to protect the payments  mechanism 
in  a way  that  is  free  of  the  kinds  of  moral  hazard  problems  that  are 
associated  with  deposit  insurance.  The idea is not new;  it dates  at least 
to Simons  (1936). And it has a distinguished  and diverse group of advo- 
cates,  including  Friedman  (1959) and Tobin (1987). 
While we  sympathize  with  the objectives of narrow banking,  we have 
several  related  concerns.  First, in  the  contemporary  financial  climate, 
cleanly  separating  money  from lending  is  not  as  straightforward  as it 
was  at the  time  Simons  wrote  (1936). Because  of financial innovation, 
banks  now  finance  loans,  not  only  with  transaction  accounts,  but also 
with  a wide  range  of money  substitutes,  i.e.,  financial assets  that may 
be quickly converted  to money.  These include  highly liquid instruments 
such  as  savings  accounts,  time  and  cash  management  accounts,  and 
money  market instruments.  Off-balance sheet  items  such as credit lines 
and loan commitments  also provide  liquidity  services  for bank custom- 
ers. Today these  money  substitutes  and off-balance sheet  commitments 
are likely  a  greater  overall  source  of  liquidity  risk  to  banks  than  are 
transaction  accounts,  which  now  make up  less  than 20% of total bank 
liabilities  (as compared  with  over 60% at the time narrow banking  pro- 
posals  were  first introduced-recall  Fig. 7). 
More generally,  today  the  process  of liquidity  provision  by banks  is 
tied  less  closely  (if much  at all) to  the  quantity  of  transaction  deposit 
liabilities  they  offer.  As  we  have  emphasized  earlier, financial stability 
in a contemporary  environment  hinges  mainly  on the sound  operation 
of  the  money  market.  In this  vein,  the  problem  of  managed  liability 
runs  of  the  type  experienced  by  Continental  Illinois  is  unlikely  to be 
solved  by narrow banking. 
We do agree that inferring the consequences  of narrow banking based 
on  banks'  existing  portfolio  structures  is  subject  to  a Lucas  critique, 
because  these  portfolio  structures would  likely change.  While the aver- 
age maturity of bank liabilities might lengthen,  we  still strongly  suspect 
that,  as has  been  the  case  historically,  banking  would  still involve  the 
provision  of  liquid  liabilities  and  the  holding  of  illiquid  information- 
intensive  assets.  At  a minimum,  forecasting  the  outcome  of a narrow 
bank policy  involves  a huge  degree  of uncertainty.  The downside  risk 
is also great given  the central role of commercial banking  in short-term 
lending  (both on and off the balance  sheet).26 
26. As  Lucas  (1988,  p.  288) puts  it,  "Attempting  various  policies  that may  be proposed 
on actual economies  and watching  the outcome  must not be taken as a serious solution 364 ?  BOYD  & GERTLER 
For these  reasons,  we  think that any scaling back of the public safety 
net should  occur on an incremental  basis.  In this respect,  we  see virtue 
in exploring  the possibility  of some  form of coinsurance,  where  deposi- 
tors bear some  of the  risk,  much  as a deductible  for health  insurance. 
As  stressed  by  Boyd  and  Rolnick  (1989),  the  policy  has  the  virtue  of 
permitting  gradual  adjustments,  because  the  fraction  of  the  deposit 
guaranteed  is a continuous  choice  variable.  Indeed,  Volcker (1991) has 
suggested  experimentation  with  some  form of coinsurance. 
Appendix  DISTRIBUTION  OF BANKS  ACROSS  REGIONS 
AND SIZE  CLASSES,  1983 vs. 1986 
Size classa 
1983 
Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  Total 
New  England  104  62  56  40  9  1  272 
Mid. Atlantic  208  153  120  85  49  10  625 
S. Atlantic  859  266  159  75  42  0  1,401 
E.S.  Central  695  208  94  31  14  0  1,042 
W.S.  Central  1,741  604  272  101  24  4  2,746 
E.N.  Central  1,802  572  364  113  31  3  2,885 
W.N.  Central  2,800  422  179  35  13  0  3,449 
Mountain  660  135  73  23  17  0  908 
Pacific  340  115  56  38  21  5  575 
United  States  9,209  2,537  1,373  541  220  23  13,903 
"Asset-size  classes: 1: $0-$50 mil. 2: $50 mil.-$100 mil. 3: $100 mil.-$250 mil. 4: $250 mil.-$1 bil. 5: 
$1 bil.-$10 bil. 6: over $10 bil. 
Size classa 
1986 
Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  Total 
New England  61  50  62  51  17  1  242 
Mid. Atlantic  147  126  144  90  63  13  583 
S. Atlantic  682  306  186  86  61  6  1,327 
E.S. Central  531  242  122  34  20  0  949 
W.S. Central  1,694  615  307  104  24  2  2,746 
E.N. Central  1,455  630  421  150  40  3  2,699 
W.N. Central  2,461  478  188  45  19  2  3,193 
Mountain  633  152  82  27  19  1  914 
Pacific  272  138  93  45  25  5  578 
United  States  7,936  2,737  1,605  632  288  33  13,231 
Asset-size classes: 1: $0-$50 mil. 
$1 bil.-$10 bil. 6: over $10 bil. 
2: $50 mil.-$100 mil. 3: $100 mil.-$250 mil. 4: $250 mil.-$l  bil. 5: 
method:  Social Experiments  on the grand scale may be instructive  and admirable, but 
they  are best  admired  at a distance." U.S. Commercial  Banking  365 
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Comment 
FISCHER  BLACK 
Goldman,  Sachs,  and  Co. 
Larry Summers  (1987) contrasts  the  "finance"  and  "economics"  views 
of the world-views  that are so different  they  hardly overlap.  This pa- 
per gives  me  a chance  to illustrate his point  using  contrasting  views  of 
banking. 
Boyd  and  Gertler take the  "economics"  view.  While  they  recognize 
the fact that a bank can decouple  its deposits  and loans,  they emphasize 
the  ties  between  traditional  bank  assets  and  liabilities.  For example, 
they  think  the  "too-big-to-fail"  subsidy  to  a bank's  stockholders  and 
creditors  affects  the  performance  of  its  assets.  They  think  that  bank 
failures  are bad and  that a major threat to a bank is a panic that leads 
to a run on the bank.  They think banks  affect the economy  by varying 
their willingness  to lend  and  occasionally  by triggering  or transmitting 
a major liquidity  crisis. 
I take the  "finance"  view.  I believe  that banks'  main businesses  are 
(1) making  and  administering  loans,  and  (2) processing  transactions.  I 
think bank failures  are a symptom  of healthy  competition  and  that re- 
moval  of government  restraints on competition  will generate  failures at 
an increasing  rate. I think the main threat to a bank is bad luck,  severe 
enough  to  cause  the  market  value  of  its  assets  to  fall below  the  face 
value  of its short-term  liabilities.  I think the economy  affects banks,  as 
the areas in which  banks concentrate  their loans do well or badly. When 
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a crisis occurs,  I view  it as a solvency  crisis rather than a liquidity crisis. 
I think banks  are innocent  victims  rather than active participants in the 
crisis. 
Economists  like Simon,  Friedman,  and Tobin have proposed  forms of 
"narrow banking"  to deal with potential  risks in banking.  They suggest 
backing  checkable  deposits  with  100% primary or secondary  reserves. 
(We can do this without  limiting  the businesses  a bank can engage  in.) 
Under the economics  view,  this benefits  the economy  by making liquid- 
ity  crises  less  likely,  or perhaps  by  improving  government  control  of 
the money  supply. 
Under  the finance view,  an unregulated  banking  system  will offer its 
customers  many  kinds  of  deposits,  including  deposits  that  are  fully 
secured  with  safe  assets.  If the  government  requires  that  most  or all 
deposits  be  fully  secured,  no  great harm is  done.  A bank will  simply 
issue  securities  to fund  its other  activities.  With unrestrained  competi- 
tion,  safe deposits  will offer interest and services at the wholesale  short- 
term money  rate. 
Under  the finance view,  loans and deposits  are unrelated.  Loans plus 
investments  on  the  asset  side  equals  deposits  plus  securities  on  the 
liability side.  The cushion  provided  by investments  and securities allows 
loans  and  deposits  to be  decoupled.  Moreover,  banks  can use  deriva- 
tives  like swaps  to adjust the risks that stockholders  and creditors face. 
Thus,  when  the  government  subsidizes  deposits  by  offering  insur- 
ance  and  "too-big-to-fail"  guarantees  below  cost,  the  benefits  of  this 
flow primarily to stockholders  rather than to borrowers.  When the gov- 
ernment  protects  banks  from competition  by  regulating  its  prices  and 
services,  and by restricting branching  and other forms of growth,  both 
borrowers  and users  of transaction  services  pay more than they  would 
in a free market. 
Boyd  and  Gertler analyze  the  patterns  of loan  losses  and  find  them 
concentrated  in certain sectors and businesses.  They find that fractional 
loan losses  were larger for small and large banks than for medium-sized 
banks.  I assume  that  returns  to  stockholders  were  better  in  medium- 
sized  banks,  too. 
To  me,  this  is  largely  the  luck  of  the  draw,  especially  because  the 
government  discourages  massive  consolidation  of banking  and,  thus, 
encourages  specialization.  (Boyd and Gertler also note  that the govern- 
ment  encourages  specialization.)  These  sectors  and  regions  did  poorly 
for reasons  mostly  unrelated  to banking  (although  banks may have bid 
up certain prices), and the banks in these areas did poorly too. Medium- 
sized banks happened  to be concentrated  in areas that did relatively well. 
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banks  in  this  period.  They  think  that  the  "too-big-to-fail"  regulatory 
philosophy  was  a partial explanation.  I feel  that this  philosophy  may 
have  encouraged  the  banks  to use  small  amounts  of capital, but need 
not in itself encourage  them  to make bad loans  or investments.  On the 
other hand,  if regulators are diligent in preventing  banks from adjusting 
their liabilities to add risk, I agree that the banks might eventually  start 
making  poor loans  to add risk. 
In their  empirical  tests,  Boyd  and  Gertler talk about  "significance." 
They  even  refer to  some  results  as  "highly  significant."  But I believe 
they  are treating  different  observations  as independent  that are not  at 
all independent,  especially  because  they use accounting  data and cross- 
sectional analysis.  Moreover,  their whole  study suggests  a kind of "data 
mining."  They  chose  real  estate  and  LDC loans  knowing  that  these 
areas did badly  in this period. 
They  cite  McCauley  and  Seth  as  claiming  that  CD  reserve  require- 
ments  affect lending.  In the language  of finance,  reserve  requirements 
act as a tax on deposits  but need  not affect loans.  Banks can sell invest- 
ments  to  make  loans  or can  issue  nondeposit  liabilities  like  common 
stock and bonds. 
They  say  regulatory  policy  must  be  designed  from an  international 
perspective.  If the  goal  is deposit  safety,  I don't  see  why.  Just require 
collateral  for  U.S.  deposits,  including  those  in  domestic  branches  of 
foreign  banks. 
They say that banks' liabilities are more and more sensitive  to changes 
in  short  rates.  Yes,  but  they  are less  and  less  sensitive  to  changes  in 
long  rates. And banks can hedge  either of these  sensitivities,  so I don't 
know  why  this matters. 
Boyd  and  Gertler say that a "panic withdrawal  of money  market in- 
struments"  causes  individual  banks  to collapse  and may even  threaten 
the whole  banking  system.  The finance view  is that a panic withdrawal 
is not a threat to a solvent  bank,  especially  one  that holds  collateral for 
its  deposits.  A  panic  certainly  doesn't  threaten  the  whole  system,  if 
banks  in general  are solvent.  (A bank is  "solvent"  if the  market value 
of its assets  exceeds  the face value  of its current liabilities.) 
Boyd and Gerlter see banks as using  money  from deposits  (and other 
liabilities) to make loans  to people  who  have no other sources  of financ- 
ing.  I see  banks  as  using  money  from  stock  and  bonds  (along  with 
deposits)  to  make  loans  to  people  who  can  also  borrow  from finance 
companies.  In fact, I think if you make a loan to someone  with no other 
sources  of funds,  you  are probably making  a bad loan. 
I don't  know  what  to  make  of  Boyd  and  Gertler's  empirical  work. Comment  *  371 
Everything  seems  so  specific  to  the  period  they  look  at.  If real estate 
and  oil  prices  had  risen  in  that period,  their results  would  have  been 
totally different.  Yet they  speak  of their results  as "highly  significant." 
They  observe  that,  for the  1984-1991  period,  even  when  we  control 
for region,  medium-sized  banks  did  better  than  large  banks  or small 
banks.  Because  size is important  in this period,  along with region,  they 
feel that "the too-big-to-fail  policy  has been  a significant  distortion." 
If size  had  not been  important  in this  period,  they  would  have  con- 
cluded  that  "constraints  on  the  banks'  ability  to  diversify  nationally 
have  inhibited  banking."  They  find  that  large  banks  did  badly  even 
when  we  control  for their large holdings  of commercial  and  industrial 
loans  and  commercial  real estate  loans,  as  opposed  to personal  mort- 
gage  loans  and other personal  loans. 
I think  the  pattern  they  find  is simply  an accident  of the  period.  In 
other  periods,  I think  they'll  find  large  banks  doing  well;  and  in  yet 
other periods,  doing  the same as medium  or small banks.  And I do not 
see  how  we  can conclude  anything  from these  cross-sectional  correla- 
tions  about the  "too-big-to-fail"  policy  or about constraints  on national 
diversification. 
Boyd and Gertler cite Diamond  and Dybvig,  who  take the economics 
view  of  banking  and  liquidity  crises.  I would  cite Merton  and  Bodie, 
who  take the finance view  of banking  and solvency  problems  (e.g.,  see 
Merton  and Bodie,  1992). 
When  Boyd  and  Gertler discuss  proposals  for narrow banking,  they 
note  that banks  might  still have  liquid  liabilities,  including  contingent 
liabilities,  that are not covered  by collateral requirements.  They feel that 
this leaves  banks  exposed  to a liquidity  crisis. The finance view  is that 
it leaves  banks exposed  to solvency  problems; and that holders  of such 
liabilities who  are concerned  about credit risk can ask for collateral even 
when  the  government  doesn't  require it. 
Bagehot  said  the  business  of banking  ought  to be  simple.  Perhaps, 
but it seems  that "economists"  like Boyd and Gertler and "finance peo- 
ple" like Merton and Bodie can't agree on what the business  of banking 
is.  So maybe  it's not  so simple. 
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Comment1 
MARTIN S. FELDSTEIN 
Harvard  University  and NBER 
The paper by John Boyd and Mark Gertler is both useful  and  stimulat- 
ing.  Their statistical portrait of the commercial  banking  industry  today 
and their analysis  of trends in recent years provide  a careful quantifica- 
tion  that  supports  some  of the  common  assertions  about  our banking 
system  while  refuting  others.  Anyone  interested  in  U.S.  banking  can 
benefit  from a careful study  of their paper. 
There is no  doubt  that Boyd  and  Gertler are correct that the  nature 
of  commercial  banking  is  changing  and  that  banks'  loans,  especially 
bank  loans  made  by  large U.S.  banks,  are playing  a relatively  smaller 
role in financing  businesses  than they  did a generation  ago.  While the 
relative  decline  of an industry  is generally  not a reason  to change  gov- 
ernment  policies,  in this  case I think it is.  It is not just that banks play 
a very special role in the economy.  The more compelling  case for chang- 
ing  government  policies  is  that  it is  the  existing  government  policies 
themselves  that are accelerating  the decline  of banking and moving  the 
role  of  banking  further  from  what  it would  be  without  such  adverse 
policies. 
Although  much  of  the  traditional  lending  activity  of  banks  can  be 
carried out  by  nonbank  financial  institutions  and  directly  by  financial 
markets, banks are uniquely  important in at least three ways.  Banks are 
the principal providers  of credit to small and medium-size  nonfinancial 
businesses.  Banks  are  the  core  of  the  payment  mechanism  through 
check clearing and related transactions.  And banks (through the system 
of reserve  requirements)  are the link by which  the Federal Reserve  can 
in principle  control a broad monetary  aggregate  and therefore nominal 
GDP.2 
I believe  that  the  relative  decline  of bank  lending  reflects  favorable 
technological  changes  as  well  as inappropriate  public  policies.  To the 
extent that government  policies continue  to weaken  banks and to reduce 
1. These remarks  were prepared as a comment on the paper by John Boyd and Mark 
Gertler  at the NBER's  Eighth  Annual Macroeconomics  Conference  on March  13, 1993. 
2. The Federal  Reserve  has lost the ability  to control  short-term  movements  of M2  because 
reserve  requirements  are limited to only about one-fifth  of M2. This could be remedied 
without cost to the government  or to the banks  by extending  reserve  requirements  and 
paying interest on those reserves. For a discussion of this, see my 1992 Tinbergen 
lecture: "The Recent Failure  of U.S. Monetary  Policy," forthcoming  in The  Economist 
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their ability to compete,  there is reason  to revise  those  policies.  Let me 
look,  therefore,  at the reasons  for the relative  decline  of bank loans. 
Large corporations  have  substituted  commercial paper and bonds  for 
bank  finance.  The  ability  to  sell  these  debt  instruments  with  interest 
rates that are more attractive to the borrowers  than the interest rates on 
bank loans has been  aided by the spread of money  market mutual funds 
and  bond  funds.  Although  there  are several  reasons  for the  develop- 
ment  of  these  funds,  the  process  has  clearly been  accelerated  by  the 
development  of computer  and related communication  technology.  This 
technological  change  that reduces  the need  for intermediaries  is a plus 
for the economy,  lowering  the cost of funds to borrowers and permitting 
greater diversification  of risks. There is no reason  for regret or for poli- 
cies to reverse  this development. 
But the  ability of banks  to compete  has  also been  adversely  affected 
by a series  of policies  stretching  back to the  1930s and even  earlier that 
many  experts  are now  rightly questioning  and proposing  to change. 
The  so-called  banking  reforms  of  the  1930s had  three  primary  fea- 
tures.  First,  the  government  created  the  deposit  insurance  system 
(FDIC), a program that helped  the weaker banks to retain deposits  and 
prevented  the  consolidation  of the banking  industry  into a small num- 
ber  of  lower-cost  national  banks  (of  the  type  seen  in  all other  major 
countries)  that  could  then  play  a  more  competitive  role  in  credit 
markets.3 
Second,  the  Glass-Steagall  Act  prevented  banks  from  branching 
across  state lines,  a type  of regulation  that reinforced  earlier state and 
federal laws  prohibiting  the development  of nationwide  banking.  Once 
again,  the  intended  beneficiaries  were  the  small banks,  but  the  effect 
was  to  raise  the  costs  and  increase  the  concentration  of  risks  in  the 
banking  system  as a whole. 
Third, the Glass-Steagall  Act separated commercial bank lending  from 
the  investment  bank activities  of underwriting  debt  and  equity  securi- 
ties,  denying  banks  the  economies  of  scope  that  such  one-stop- 
shopping  for financial services  would  allow.  Although  it was  argued at 
the  time  that  this  would  protect  unwary  individuals  from banks  that 
would  otherwise  entice  them  into  the  risky investments  that they  had 
3. The adverse  effects  of the  FDIC were  made  much  worse  by the  decision  in the  1970s 
to extend  deposit  insurance  to deposits  of $100,000 at a time when  interest  rates were 
unregulated  only  for balances  of $100,000  or more.  It allowed  very  weak  institutions 
to compete  for funds  in a national  market through  brokered  deposits.  It not  only  put 
temptation  before  the incompetent  and the unscrupulous  but also forced many  sound 
banks and thrifts to follow  aggressive  deposit-seeking  (and, therefore,  lending)  policies 
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underwritten,  a skeptical  view  of this  as the  real reason  for the policy 
may be very  well  justified. 
Old laws  are hard to change  despite  considerable  research indicating 
their  adverse  effects.  The  Federal  Reserve  has  granted  limited  under- 
writing  authority  to  a few  banks,  but  legislation  to  repeal  the  overall 
prohibition  has  failed  in Congress.  Similarly,  although  there  has  been 
an  increase  in  interstate  banking,  the  legislation  to  authorize  general 
interstate branching  failed last year. And,  despite  the disastrous  experi- 
ence with  insolvent  thrifts attracting large amounts  of federally insured 
funds,  the  FDIC  system  continues  to  provide  protection  to  all  bank 
deposits  up  to $100,000. 
The FDIC is an impediment  to a stronger  banking  system,  not  only 
because  it protects  the  weak  and  reduces  the  forces  that would  other- 
wise  increase  concentration,  but also because  the charge for FDIC pro- 
tection  raises  the cost  of bank funds  relative to funds  raised directly in 
financial markets.  The cost of commercial paper funds  to a high-quality 
corporate borrower  is lower  than the combination  of the bank's cost of 
deposits  and  the FDIC premium. 
Banks  might  be  able  to  play  a  more  active  role  in  financing  large 
businesses  and  might  as a result  be  able to play  a more  active  role in 
other markets as well,  if they were permitted  to take uninsured  demand 
deposits  and to use those  funds  for lending.  In principle,  those  deposits 
might  be  secured  either  by  the  loan  portfolio  alone  or by  those  assets 
and some  portion  of the bank's own  equity  capital. Although  the ratio- 
nale  for precluding  this  is to protect  unwary  depositors,  those  deposi- 
tors are now  permitted  to buy  checkable  money  market mutual  funds 
within  the banks'  offices. 
A  different  major reason  for the  problems  of the  commercial  banks 
in the  1980s was  the  large losses  incurred  on  LDC debts.  These  losses 
impaired bank capital and raised the cost of uninsured  deposits,  further 
hampering  the  ability  of  banks  to  compete  with  nonbank  sources  of 
funds.  Although  the banks lent voluntarily  to the developing  countries, 
they  were  encouraged  by  the  U.S.  government  in  the  1970s to  make 
those  loans as a way  of "recycling petrodollars."  After the LDC borrow- 
ers  got  in  trouble  in  the  early  1980s,  our  government  temporarily 
worked  to prevent  defaults  by the major borrowers.  At the same  time, 
however,  it  encouraged  the  banks  to  establish  large  reserves  (which 
weakened  the reported  capital positions  of the banks) and then,  in the 
"Brady Plan,"  required  the  banks  to accept  writedowns  in the  values 
of the loans. 
Perhaps  the  most  fundamental  way  in  which  government  policy 
weakened  the  banks  was  by  pursuing  monetary  policies  during  the Comment  - 375 
1960s and  1970s that caused  inflation  to rise sharply.  The interaction of 
inflation  and  the  tax  laws  made  the  real  after-tax  cost  of  borrowing 
negative  for many  borrowers  and,  thus,  encouraged  a great overexten- 
sion of borrowing.  This tax-inflation interaction also raised the prices of 
land  and  other  real estate,  again  encouraging  excessive  lending.  Infla- 
tion contributed  to the commodity  boom in Latin America that increased 
lending  to those  countries.4 
Other  examples  of  government  policies  that  hurt banking  could  be 
added  to this  list.  The government's  record in this industry  is enough 
to  make  one  skeptical  about  the  desirability  of  the  most  recent  major 
area of regulation,  the  Basel capital standards.  Even if one  accepts  the 
need  for increased  capital to protect  the  government  from the  adverse 
incentives  that it has created by providing  excessive  deposit  insurance, 
the specific  features  of the Basel rules and the direction in which  those 
rules  are evolving  should  be a source  of concern. 
The  Basel  system  of  risk-based  capital  requirements  is  based  on  a 
gross  mismeasurement  of both  risks and capital.  In assessing  risks,  all 
bonds  of OECD government  are considered  to be riskless regardless  of 
maturity.  All  single-family  mortgages  are regarded  as  less  risky  than 
all commercial  loans  (regardless  of the  credit rating of the  commercial 
borrower or the collateral provided)  and regardless of whether  the mort- 
gages  have fixed or adjustable interest rates, of their loan-to value ratios, 
etc.  It  is  not  surprising  that  government  bonds  and  mortgages  are 
crowding  out commercial  lending  in banks' portfolios. 
The  regulators  acknowledge  the  inadequacy  of  their  risk measures 
and  respond  by  proposing  more  detailed  systems  of  risk evaluation. 
The end may be a micromanagement  of banks' portfolios by bank regu- 
lators  or by  differential  capital  standards.  We  are already  seeing  the 
temptation  to  use  this  as  a  form  of  industrial  policy,  targeting  small 
businesses  for more favorable treatment. 
The capital of the banks is equally badly measured.  No credit is given 
for the  value  of bank  activities  as a going  business  (e.g.,  a credit card 
business  or money  management  business  or core deposits)  unless  those 
assets  are sold.5 All assets  are carried at book values  that may bear little 
relation to market values. 
Even if I were  convinced  by the Boyd-Gertler argument  that the too- 
big-to-fail  doctrine  was  causing  the handful  of very large banks to take 
4. For  a more extensive discussion  of the way that  inflation  weakened the financial  system, 
see my introductory  essay  in Martin Feldstein,  Reducing the Risk of Economic  Crisis (Uni- 
versity of Chicago Press, 1991). 
5. This is discussed further  in my Wall  Street  Journal  article  of February  21, 1991. 376 *  FELDSTEIN 
excessive  risks,  I would  not  regard imposing  the Basel accord rules on 
all of the banks  in the United  States as an appropriate  remedy.6 
In short,  my  reading  of  the  current  situation  is  that banks  play  an 
important  role  in  the  economy  and  government  policies  that  weaken 
the banking  system  are contrary to the national interest.  Unfortunately, 
there is no  shortage  of such  policies  and more may be on their way. 
Discussion 
In response  to the  Comment  by Fischer Black, Gertler made  two  main 
points.  First, he  expressed  surprise  at Black's characterization  of their 
view  of banking: A large part of the paper was devoted  to documenting 
the evolution  of banking  away from simply  taking deposits  and making 
loans  toward  obtaining  money  through  money  markets and  engaging 
in off-balance  sheet  activities.  Second,  with  respect to Black's story that 
the  banking  problems  of  the  1980s were  just  bad  luck,  Gertler noted 
that of course  they  were  bad  luck: The large banks  took a gamble  and 
lost.  One  could  say  the  same  thing  about  the  savings  and  loans.  The 
paper  tries to go  beyond  such  a statement  and  argues  that regulatory 
bias may  have  induced  the  large banks  to take greater risks than  they 
would  have  independent  of the regulatory  structure. 
Bob Hall noted  that the  distinction  drawn  by Black between  finance 
and economics  was  misleading:  Few economists  fall into the traps that 
he  identified  (e.g.,  the  notion  that  reserve  requirements  limit loans  is 
not  something  that  economists  teach).  Hall  also  remarked  that  the 
phrase  "narrow banking"  is an unfortunate  choice  of words  in that it 
suggests  that we  have  to impose  tight regulatory  limits on bank activi- 
ties  in  order  to  limit  the  costs  of  deposit  insurance.  On  the  contrary, 
we  can open  up all activities  without  any regulatory concern if we  sim- 
ply give depositors  a security interest in Treasury bills. If the bank enters 
bankruptcy,  the  depositor  with  a  security  interest  receives  the  asset 
instead  of  becoming  party  to  the  bankruptcy.  By requiring  a security 
interest in Treasury bills,  the government  could eliminate  the pricing of 
6. The Boyd-Gertler  evidence linking the too-big-to-fail  principle  to bank performance  is 
not convincing. Their  largest class of banks have assets over $10 billion, far below the 
cutoff level for "too big to fail." Although the loss ratios are higher in their largest 
category  of banks, that may reflect the fact that large banks do more selling of explicit 
risk services like lines of credit. When the borrowers  take up those lines, they are in 
trouble  and cannot get market  credit. There  is no reason to regard  this form of special- 
ization as excessive if the banks are compensated  adequately.  If they are not, the stock 
market  will impose its own discipline. 
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deposit  insurance.  Gertler noted  that in  an editorial  in the  Wall Street 
Journal, one  of the  previous  chairmen  of the  FDIC discussed  a similar 
proposal,  called  a modified  payout  plan.  When  the bank went  under, 
the FDIC would  advance  the uninsured  depositors  an estimate  of what 
they  thought  they  would  collect  from the bank.  However,  the  magni- 
tude  of the  expected  losses  of Continental  Illinois bank failure was  so 
large that this plan was  scrapped. 
In  his  Comment,  Martin  Feldstein  discussed  several  reasons  why 
banks  play  a  special  role  in  the  economy.  Hall  took  issue  with  this 
position.  First,  Feldstein  claimed  that  banks  are special  because  they 
facilitate  the  clearing  of  payments.  But,  citing  the  VISA NET clearing 
service  for  Visa  transactions,  which  is  jointly  owned  by  banks,  Hall 
argued  that  VISA  NET is  really  a  separate  entity  and  could  be  spun 
off easily.  There is nothing  intrinsic about limiting  payments  to banks. 
Feldstein  also suggested  that banks are special as an agent of monetary 
control.  Hall  remarked  that  here  the  "finance  economist's"  view  of 
Fischer  Black is  relevant.  Monetary  control  is  achieved  by  identifying 
some  part  of  the  national  debt  with  a  special  instrument  we  call the 
dollar, and we  peg  its price at one  dollar. By changing  the terms or the 
quantity  of that instrument,  we  achieve  monetary  control.  However,  it 
is  only  because  of  things  like  reserve  requirements  that  this  has  any- 
thing  to  do  with  the  banking  system.  If we  took  half  of  all Treasury 
bills,  called  them  dollars,  and just manipulated  the difference  between 
the interest  rate that we  paid  on those  special T bills to regular T bills, 
we  would  have  another  system  of monetary  control  that had  nothing 
to do with  the banking  system. 
David  Romer noted  that a general  concern  about  narrow banking  is 
that the part of banks that were  not insured  would  end up looking  very 
much  like banks  today.  They  would  issue  highly  liquid assets  such  as 
money  market  funds  as  their  source  of  funds  and  then  make  illiquid 
loans.  Once  again,  bank runs,  panics,  and  failures  would  be possible, 
and  we  would  have  reason  to  fear  their  consequences  for  economic 
performance. 
Feldstein  returned  to a theme  in the paper by noting  that the experi- 
ment  of changing  what happens  in banks is already occurring. He went 
on to say that banks  are moving  aggressively  to sell mutual  funds  and 
money  market funds because  depositors  do not want deposit  insurance; 
they want  slightly  higher yields.  Stan Fischer responded  that he did not 
think  depositors  were  showing  they  were  willing  to  bear  more  risk. 
Rather,  they  are showing  they  want  higher  returns  and  do  not  think 
they  will have  to bear the risk. Eventually,  though,  banks will fail, and 
the  banks  will  be  bailed  out  through  the  political  system,  as  David 
Romer suggested. 